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ABSTRACT 
This thesis deals with the rise of Turkish national identity and the 
emergence of Turkish nationalism. In doing so, it begins by providing a 
lieterature review and a theoretical analyses of nationalism in general 
and Turkish nationalism in particular. This study argues that there is no 
unique way of studying the rise of Turkish nationalism, because of the 
wide range of theories on nationalism, various interpretations about the 
origins of nationalist movements and different historical facts. 
The thesis focuses on the historical background of Turkish nationalism 
at the last quarter of the 19th century. In this period, the Young 
Ottomans were the most important figures in the formation of national 
identity. They introduced the ideas of patriotism and nationalism to the 
Ottoman public for the first time and their influence on the thought and 
action of the generations that followed was extremely influential. After 
the Young Ottoman Era, The Young Turks and the Committee of Union 
and Progress had a significant role in stimulating the national 
sentiments. This thesis demonstrates such·significance by examining in 
detail the ideas of Ziya Gokalp and Yusuf Akc;ura, the outstanding 
representatives of Turkish nationalist ideology. 
Throughout the study, the identity problem and the attitudes of the 
intellectuals towards the national identity costitute the focus of this 
lll 
thesis. It is indicated that the Ottoman intellectuls were in a search for 
alternative solutions to maintain and save their state from the existent 
discontents and problems. The maintenance and perpetuation of the 
state have led them to reach more pragmatic and immediate solutions. 
The conclusion that this thesis arrives at is that the adaptation of the 
national identity was a way of overcoming the maladies of the state. In 
this sense, even if Turkish nationalism appears to be contradictory, that 
is, both against and for the West, it perceived its mission of creating a 
coherent identity as consistent with its aim to restore state power. 
iv 
oz 
Bu tez, Turk milli kimliginin dogu~u ve Turk milliyetc;iliginin ortaya 
c;1k1~m1 ele almaktad1r. Bu amac;la tez genel olarak milliyet<;ilik, ozel 
olarak da Turk milliyet<;iligi hususunda literatUr taramas1 ve bir 
kuramsal c;ozumleme yaparak ba~lamaktadir. Bu tezde milliyet<;ilik 
kuramlanmn c;ok c;e~itli olmas1, milliyetc;i hareketlerin kokenleri 
hususunda muhtelif yorumlann yap1lmas1 ve farkh farkh tarihsel 
olgularm bulunmasmdan otUru Turk milliyetc;iliginin dogu~unu 
~ah§mamn tek ve yegane bir yolunun bulunmad1g1 ileri sUrU!mi..i§tUr. 
Bu c;ah§mada 19. yuzy1lm son <;eyreginde Turk milliyetc;iliginin tarihsel 
arka plam uzerinde durulmaktadtr. Bu donemde Gen<; Osmanhlar milli 
kimligin olu§umundaki en onemli ~ahsiyetler olmu§tur. Osmanhlan ilk 
defa vatan perverlik ve milliyet<;ilik du~uncesiyle onlar tam§tlrm1§lar ve 
kendilerinden sonra gelecek olan nesillerin du~unce ve eylemleri 
uzerinde oldukc;a etkili olmu~lardir. Gen<; Osmanhlar doneminden sonra, 
Jon Turkler ve ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti milli hislerin uyandmlmasmda 
onemli roller oynam1~lardir. Bu tezde Turk milliyetc;iligi ideolojisinin en 
onde gelen temsilcileri Ziya Gokalp ve Yusuf Akc;ura'nm dli§unceleri de 
detayh olarak incelenmektedir. 
Tez boyunca, kimlik sorunu ve aydmlarm milli kimlige kar~1 tutumlan 
<;ah~mamn temel odak noktasmt olu§turmaktadir. Bu <;ah~mada 
v 
Osmanh aydmlanmn devleti varolan ho§nutsuzluk ve sorunlardan 
korumak ve kurtarmak amac1yla alternatif cozUm aray1§lan i~erisinde 
oldugu vurgulanarak devleti kurtarmak ve onun bekasm1 saglamak 
kaygtsmm aydmlan daha ivedi ve pragmatik cozUmlere sevkettigi 
belirtilmi~tir. Bu tezin vard1gt sonu~; milli kimligin adaptasyonunun, 
devletin icinde bulundugu sorunlann Ustesinden gelmenin bir yolu 
olarak gercekle~tigi ~eklindedir. Bu meyanda, TUrk milliyetciligi hem 
Batt kar~ttt hem de Batt yanltst olarak ~eli~kili gorunse de, devlet 
iktidarmm giiciine kavu~masrnr amacfayarak tutarlr bir bicimde uyumf u 
bir kimlik olu~turmu~tur. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
" ... 0 kadar meyus alma Ti.irkiya zannolundugu 
kadar 1rabuk hanta-i alemden silinmez. 
Avrupa'da ve Afrika'da, si.ikuti bekas1 
mi.imki.insi.iz gibi gozi.iki.iyor ise de Asya'da 
daha pek 1rok seneler icra-y1 ahkam edebilir ... " 
ibrahimTemo'dan ishak Si.ikuti'ye 
25 May1s 19001 
At the end of the nineteenth century, there began in the Ottoman Empire 
a shift from one system of social thought to another. The change from 
the notion of the non-national state to the modern nation-state, in other 
words the emergence of nationalist ideas in the region marked a turning 
point in the history of the Middle East. The new system of thought 
entailed a drastic rupture from the old identities which stabilized the 
social and political life of the region for several hundred years. Instead, 
it offered a new identity which involved a displacement of the old 
identities by a rational, revolutionary programme of action based on 
Enlightenment, and the representatives of this new system of thought 
attempted to remake the social world in the light of their image of 
perfection. 
1 Hanioglu,M.~. Bir Siyasa/ Orgiit Olarak Osman/1 /ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jon 
Tiirkliik, Cilt.1: ( 1889-1902) ileti~im Yaymlan, istanbul, 1989, p.-634. 
The above is a rather obvious and ordinary way of describing the 
change, but in fact the reality has gone deeper and more complex. This 
transformation can not be explained by merely arguing that the people's 
minds have moved from the religious idea to the nationalist rational 
ideology. I believe that there were divergent, as well as convergent, 
situations in the Ottoman Empire that are intimately related to the 
transformation of the region. By ignoring these various factors, we 
would misinterpret and overstate the case. The study of Turkish 
nationalism and the new identity formation should be more carefully 
scrutinized and coherently assessed. 
The various nationalist movements in the Middle East arouse in 
response to different challenges. I believe, Turkish nationalism was a 
reaction to the continuing and growing pressure from Europe and to the 
breakdown of the ideal of Ottomanist elements of unity (ittihad-i anasir). 
Adittionally, the rising separatist movements of different nationalities 
that threatened such unity, the loss of the territorries and the decrease 
in legitimizing power of the state increasingly led the Turks to incline 
towards the estimation of a new identity that had shaken the very 
establishment of the integrating Ottoman State. As the various 
nationalities of the empire seceded one by one, "Ottomanism aquired 
more of an Islamic coloring, but when, under Abdulhamid, the alliance 
between the throne and the Turkish ruling elite broke down, the idea of a 
Turkish nation emerged: the idea, that is, that the empire could survive 
only on the basis of the solidarity of a nation united by a common 
language. 2" 
2Hourani, Albert. (1991) A History of the Arab Peoples, Harvard Univ. Press, 
Massachusetts, p.309. 
2 
The emegence of Turkish nationalism has been described and explained 
in quite a number of ways. There exists various interpretations of the 
origins of Turkism. The variety of these descriptions mainly stem from 
the difficulty of finding accurate historical facts pertinent for the Turkish 
case. Moreover, the methodology in history determines the way of 
studying a historical period or subject. There are different categories 
and historical methods that point to various ways of studying the 
subject. As ~erif Mardin puts it, until 1950s, studies on Turkish 
nationalism were mainly based on "praise-blame" (ovme-yerme) 
approaches and they could not develop analytical methods in Turkish 
history3• With the beginning of the 1950s, there were several attempts to 
study Turkism with a different methodology based on explanatory and 
systematic research. Studies of Hilmi Ziya Olken4, Niyazi Berkes5 and 
Uriel Heyd6 on the 19th and 20th century Ottoman-Turkish socio-cultural 
and intellectual history can be included in this category. From 1960 
onwards, new broader approaches have been put that attempted to 
revise the methodological understandings of the previous studies. 
Researches of ~erif Mardin, Bernard Lewis7, Roderic Davison8, Kemal 
Karpat9, David Kushner10 and Franyois Georgeon11 provided 
3Mardin, S. (1992) Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908, ileti~im Yaymlan, istanbul, 
p.19. 
4Ulken, Hilmi Ziya. (1992)Tiirkiye'de 9agda§ Dii§iince Tarihi, Olken Yay., istanbul, 3rd 
edition. 
5Berkes, Niyazi. (1959) (ed. and trans.) Ziya Gokalp; Turkish Nationalism and Western 
C~vilization, New York. 
6Heyd, Uriel. (1950) Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The life and teachings of Ziya 
Gokalp, The Harville Press, London. 
Lewis, Bernard. (1961) The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford Univ. Press, 
London. 
8 Davison, R. (1963) Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1850-1876, Princeton Univ. Press, 
New Jersey. 
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considerable contributions to the study of Turkish nationalism and the 
period of transformation in the Ottoman empire. In the introduction of 
Jon Tilrklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, for instance, Mardin proposed a radical 
change in the methodology and he attempted to reach a critical and 
objective evaluation of the subject12• Nevertheless, studies on Turkish 
nationalism are still not sufficient enough to reach a wide range of 
analyses. In recent years, though several works were published on the 
subject, none of them are as remarkable as the studies of Mardin and 
Kushner or as that of the analysis of Partha Chatterjee on Indian post-
colonial nationalism. This situation, I believe, stem from the persisting 
difficulty to find definite analytical tools that would explain Turkish 
nationalism. Moreover, there is the difficulty of defining certain concepts 
such as, nation, nationalism,national identity etc. That is, the central 
problematic in the study of nations and nationalism has been the 
problem of finding "definitions" of the key concepts, nation and 
nationalism. 
Several definitions on nation and nationalism have been made by 
various scholars. One of the first definition of the nation in the history of 
ideas was made by Ernest Renan. He defines the nation as a form of 
morality and a spiritual principle. For him "a nation is a grand solidarity 
constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and 
those that one is disposed to make again 13" Weber examines nation as a 
9Karpat, K. (1967) Tiirk Demokrasi Tarihi: Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kiiltiirel Deger/er, 
istanbul. 
1° Kushner, D. (1977) The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, London, Frank Cass. 
11 Georgeon, F. (1980) Turk Milliyet~iliginin Kokenleri, Yusuf Ak~ura (1876-1935), Yurt 
Vay. Ankara, tr. by Alev Er. 
12Mardin, S. (1992) Jon Tiirklerin ... , pp.7-19. 
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"prestige community" endowed with a sense of cultural mission14 • 
K.Deutsch argues that "nationality means an alignment of large numbers 
of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional 
centers and leading social groups by channel of social communication 
and economic intercourse, both indirectly from link to link and directly 
with the center15 C.Geertz indicates that there are two competing but 
complementary components --ethnic (primordial loyalties) and civic 
(desire for citizenship) -- in the nationalism of post-colonial states16• 
Anthony Giddens proposes a "statist" definition of the nation, he 
defines it as a "bordered power-container" 17 • Walker Connor, on the 
other hand, defines the nation as a community of descent and reject the 
tendencies to equate nation with state, and nationalism with state 
patriotism18• H.Seton-Watson defines nation as a community of people 
whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common 
place and a national consciousness19• It is obvious that there are several 
definitions that are different from each other. Each definition would lead 
us to different results while studying one country's nationalism. 
13Renan, E. (1994) "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" in A.D Smith . and J. Hutchinson (ed) 
Nationalism, Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, p.17. 
14Weber, M. (1994) "The Nation" in A.D Smith and J. Hutchinson (ed) Nationalism, 
Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, p. 21. 
15Deutsch, K. (1994) "Nationalism and Social Communication" in A.D Smith and J. 
Hutchinson (ed) Nationalism, Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, p. 28. 
16Geertz, C. (1994) "Primordial and Civic Ties" in A.D Smith and J. Hutchinson (ed) 
Nationalism. Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, pp.29-34. 
11Giddens, A. (1994) "The Nation as Power-Container" in A.D Smith and J. Hutchinson 
(ed) Nationalism, Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, p. 34. 
'
8Connor, W. (1994) "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ... " in A.D 
Smith and J. Hutchinson (ed) Nationalism, Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, pp. 36-46. 
19Seton-Watson, H. (1977) Nations and States, Boulder;Westview Press., p.1 . 
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The other reason that drive the scholars to analyse one nation's 
nationalism differently is mainly related with the "theories" of 
nationalism. Most of the theories accept that nationalism is particularly 
a modern phenomenon and it was not fully developed until late in the 
eighteenth or early nineteenth century. However, they differ over such 
things as the causes of nationalism, its relationship to modernization 
and to political power, and whether it is a weak or a strong agent of 
change.20 
The study of the process by which ethnic groups and nations are formed has 
been beset by a persistent and fundamental conceptual difference among 
scholars concerning the very natue of the groups involved, namely, whether 
they are natural, 'primordial', 'given' communities or whether they are 'creation' 
of interest leaders, of elite groups, or of the political system in which they are 
included? 
Theories that refer to nationalism and nation as a "creation" or an 
"invention" is most popular and widespread among the social 
scientists. Most of the pre-eminent thinkers in social sciences have 
general assumptions about the poverty (artificiality) of nationalism, that 
is, nations are artificial communities with largely fabricated ties. In other 
words, there exists an attempt to deconstruct the views that the 
perception of nationalism is a natural and inevitable aspect of 
humankind. For Anderson nation is an imagined political community, it 
is an abstraction, a construct of the imagination. 
The nation imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing 
perhaps a billion living human beings, no nation imagines itself coterminous 
20Smith A.O. and Hutchinson J. (1994) (ed) Nationalism, Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, 
p.47. 
21 8rass, Paul.R. "Elite Competition and Nation-Formation" in Nationalism, A.D.Smith 
and J.Hutchinson (ed) Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, 1994, p.83. 
6 
with mankind ... It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an 
age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of 
the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. 22 
Gellner gives a similar assessments on nationalism: "Nationalism is not 
the awakening of nations to self consciousness, it invents nations 
where they do not exist."23 Hobsbawm makes a comparable point when 
he argues that the nation is the most important of the lasting "invented 
tradition". 24 
A quite different school of theorists (Primordialists) holds that ethnic 
identity is primordial and perennial and that nations are not created or 
invented but they are the natural unit of history and an integral part of 
the human equipment. Moreover, language, religion, race and territory 
provide the basic organizing principles of human existence throughout 
history, and that these primordial ties of humanity have always divided 
the species into culture-communities, as naturally as have sex or 
geograpy: 
The primordialist argues that every person carries with him through life 
'attachments' derived from place of birth, kinship relationships, religion, 
language, and social practices that are natural for him. 25 
It is quite visible· that there is a persistent difficulty in defining, 
theorizing and interpreting nationalism, nation and so on. These 
22Anderson,B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso Editions and New Left Books. 
23Gellner,E. "Nationalism and Modernization" in Nationalism, A.D.Smith and 
J.Hutchinson (ed) Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, 1994, p.62. 
24Cited in Smith,A.D. (ed) (1992) Ethnicity and Nationalism, Leiden: E.J.Brill p.72. 
25Brass,P.R. op.cit. p.83. 
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definitions have been unable adequately to solve and to determine 
which conceptual framework can be best fitted to our study. I do not 
propose to offer a general solution to this problem. What I attempt to do 
instead is to analyse the formation and the establishment of Turkish 
nationalism from the standpoint of a certain theoretical framework that 
would explain the genuine characteristics of the Turkish case. The 
purpose of the literature review is to point to the complexity of the 
thories and definitions of nationalism. That is, there is no fixed and 
determined way of studying nationalism. Furthermore, this literature 
review would provide a basis for further theoretical considerations on 
Turkish nationalism. 
This study has another difficulty, that is, no certain and definite 
theoretical scheme could fit to the Ottoman/Turkish case. Most of the 
approaches involve some oversimplified and generalizing explanations 
and they stem from the Western based explanations. These kind of 
explanations "insists... in locating nationalism and the concepts 
characteristic of this movement in the context of European thought and 
history.1126 The Western approaches to a study of nationalism exibited a 
serious flavor of Western ethnocentrism. It holds a view of the nation-
building process as inevitable, immutable and desirable. Moreover, 
nation-building is viewed as progressive and liberal. On the Ottoman 
case, such studies have the tendency to analyze different nationalisms 
within the border of the Empire as more or less similar. 27 
26Smith,A.D. (ed) (1992) Ethnicity and Nationalism, Leiden: E.J.Brill p. 59. 
27For instance in The Age of Nationalism Kohn evaluates Turkish nationalism more 
or less the same as Persian,Russian,lndian nationalism.He does not give some 
characters that were only peculiar to the Turkish case. see Hans Kohn, The Age of 
Nationalism, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1962, pp.104-110. 
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Furthennore, the writings of Western historians seem to imply that the 
intellectual fennent of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
was monolithical and the major cause of change ... this was not so; there were 
divergent as well as convergent nationalist tendencies in the Ottoman Empire, 
and geographic, economic, social, and Great Power influences played a greater 
role in the fonnation of various nationalisms.28 
Generally, the Western historians tended to analyze Turkish nationalism 
by resorting to the category of "cultural nationalism" or Eastern organic 
nationalism. Hence, Hans Kohn's dichotomy of "Western" voluntaristic 
and "Eastern" organic nationalism is illuminating for this study. For 
Kohn, Nationalism in England, France and America is rationalist, 
optimistic and pluralist, as well as is based on the social contract, and 
the aspirations for political community of the rising middle classes with 
their ideal of social progress. Across the Rheine, however, and 
eastwards into Russia and Asia, social backwardness and the weakness 
of the middle classes produced a much more emotional and 
authoritarian nationalism which was based on the lower aristocracy and 
intelligentsia and appealing to the folk instincts of the masses. 29 Indeed, 
Turkey had manifested some elements of "organic nationalism", since it 
was a relatively backward country and the nationalist attitudes were 
stimulated especially by the intelligentsia. But the Turkish case cannot 
be limited simply to this theory. Because it has many other 
28 For William Haddad those different nationalist movements (namely Turkish, Arab, 
Greek etc.) have been viewed in the West in tenns of the concept of European secular 
nationalism. He maintains that the conventional interpretation of nationalism is much 
too narrow to be applied to the sibject peoples and provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
William W.Haddad "Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire" in W.W.Haddad and 
W.L.Ochsenwald (ed.) (1977) Nationalism in a Non-National State, The Dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire, Colombus, p.7. In recent years, several important books on 
nationalism have been published which are more consistent and objective than the 
conventional interpretations. On the other hand, for the diverse analysis of historians 
on nationalism, see Anthony Smith, "Nationalism and Historians" in Ethnicity and 
Nationalism, 1992. 
29Cited in Smith,A.D. (ed.) (1992) Ethnicity and Nationalism. Leiden: E.J.Brill, p.64. 
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characteristics, partially given above, that we should evaluate it by 
employing a different terminology. 
The other conception of Kohn, which is more or less the same with 
voluntaristic-organic distinction, is based on the separation between the 
political and cultural nationalism. In his book The Foundations of 
Turkish Nationalism, Uriel Heyd very well summarizes this theory; 
In Western Europe, particularly in England and France, the united national State 
preceded the emergence of the nation and to a large extent even created it 
... nationalism ... in these countries ... was based on the ... philosophy of 
Enlightenment with its rational approach and its individualist and universalistic 
outlook ... Political thought in England and France has on the whole emphasized 
the political and subjective aspect (of nationalism), connecting the nation 
closely with the State and finding the test of nationality in personnel feeling ... In 
Germany and other Central and Eastern countries, on the other hand, 
nationalism ... preceded the birth of a State ... Regarding the nation primarily as a 
cultural and racial entity, it tried to find objective marks of nationality such as 
the Vo/kgeist, the spirit of the people, as expressed in its language and other 
cultural phenomena. It tended to be on the whole irrational, collectivist, and 
exclusive.30 
From the standpoint of this distinction Heyd argues that Turkish 
nationalism and especially the nationalism of Gokalp are good examples 
of Eastern organic nationalism: "Although Gokalp borrowed most of his 
theories from French sociology and philosophy, his nationalism is more 
of the Central European and particularly German type. 31 " 
30Heyd, U. The Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, p.164. As we see, this kind of 
explanation implies somewhat an Eurocentric inclination. 
31 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
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Another version of this theoretical distinction has been made also by 
Elie Kedouri. For him, political definition of nationalism as a doctrine 
was formulated by new secular intellectuals and it was hostile to the 
traditional dynastic and religious order. As its primary goal, Political 
nationalism is concerned with individual and collective autonomy and 
the integration of the people in an independent state. In this sense , 
"nationalism is a form of secular milleranianism that has arisen from 
Kantian conceptions of human beings as autonomous which has led to 
politics replacing religion as the key to salvation"32• He argues that there 
are two different kinds of nationalist doctrine: the first (republican) 
which is derived from Kant and associated with political nationalism and 
the second (organic), derived from Herder that conceives and considers 
the nation as a natural solidarity settled on unique cultural 
characteristics. 33 
For Partha Chatterjee, these sort of distinctions signify a liberal-
rationalist dilemma. Because in its essential aspects, nationalism 
represents the attempt to realize in political terms the universal urge for 
liberty and progress. Yet, the evidence shows that it could also give rise 
to mindless chauvinism and xenophobia and serve as the justification of 
authoritarianism. For the Western thinkers like Kohn and John 
Plamenatz, the "Western" type manifests the good and normal side of 
nationalism and the Eastern (organic) type represents the evil and 
specific and even disturbing side of nationalism. Even so, for these 
thinkers, when this illiberal special type of nationalism appears in the 
32Cited in Smith A.O. and Hutchinson J. (1994) (ed) Nationalism, Oxford Univ.Press; 
Oxford, p.47 
33Hutchinson,J. (1992) "Moral Innovators and the Politics of Regeneration: the 
Distinctive Role of Cultural Nationalists in Nation Building" in A.D.Smith (ed.): 
Ethnicity and Nationalism, Leiden: E.J.Brill, p.102. 
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form of revivalist movements or oppressive regimes, it still represents 
an urge for progress and freedom. 34 As it is clear, this indicates that 
nationalism involves some contradictions and dilemmas. 
Obviously, applying these theories to the Ottoman-Turkish case will not 
illuminate the specificity and uniqness of Turkish case due to their 
somehow Eurocentric approach which always looks at the non-Western 
world from the Western Enlightenment and rationality based paradigm. 
Although these theories specify some contemplations on nationalism 
and reflect partial truths that is also explanatory for the Turkish case, 
they are generalizing and they contain certain dilemmas that Chatterjee 
has pointed out. 
However, I believe that, Chatterjee's theories can be applied to the 
analysis of Ottoman intellectuals. That is, the rational-liberal dilemma 
was influential in the minds of Ottoman intellectuals with regard to their 
position against the West. In this sense, Ernest Gellner clarifies the at 
odds position of the non-Western intellectuals against the Western 
modernization. For him, there is a paradoxical relationship between 
cultural nationalism and modernization: 
Nationalism is the creation of intellectuals in backward societies, who, 
threatened by the aduence of an exotic scientific-industrial culture whith which 
they find it difficult to compete, advocate a nostalgic return to the pristine 
integrated world of the folk and engage in linguistic and cultural 
reconstruction ... For what they seek is a revived folk community, but what 
results is rather a modern science-based culture with native idioms.35 
34Chatterjee, P. (1986) Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse, p.2. 
35Cited in J.Hutchinson, "Cultural nationalism and Moral Regeneration" in 
Natit:malism, A.D.Smith and J.Hutchinson (ed) Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, 1994, p.128. 
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I believe, Gellner is surely right to identify nationalism as a defensive 
response by educated elites (or intellectuals) to the impact of Western 
civilization. From this point of view, I will elucidate the subject or open a 
door to the core theme of my study by introducing the analysis of 
"identity" and the intellectuals' attitudes towards the identity problem. In 
my oppinion, the cultural/political nationalism debate ameliorated the 
issue of national identity which related to the intellectuals' position. 
To begin with, it is necessary to define the concept "national identity". 
Nation has been contested as a form of identity that competes with 
other kind of collective identity. Clearly, national identity should not be 
confused with other types of identity and it cannot be explained in 
general terms which may explain any other type of identity. It is not a 
generic, but a specific notion. Generating an identity may be a 
psychological necessity, perhaps a given element of human nature.36 
What is often admitted is the power, even primacy, of national loyalities 
and identities over those of even class, gender and racial identities. 
Perhaps only religious attachments have challenged national loyalities 
in their scope and fervour. 
At the same time, national identities go hand in hand with other kinds of 
identity or alternate with them in terms of power and salience. 3; As 
Mardin might have said, the power and salience of an identity depends 
upon its .capability to provide the emotional security. Moreover, 
"'identity' is only partly a spontaneous feeling which people have and 
36Greenfeld, Liah. (1992) Nationalism; Five Rooads to Modernity, Harvard Univ. Press, 
Massachussets, p.12. 
37Smith,A.D. and J.Hutchinson (1994) (ed) Nationalism, Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, p.4. 
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which people can inspire emotion and supreme loyalities"38 Identities 
function as the legitimizing power in a society. 
The adoption of national identity as a legitimizing power and the 
position of the intellectuals is the vantage point in the formation of 
Turkish nationalism. In order to elaborate this, I attempt to focus my 
study on the theories that would clarify the different dynamics of the 
adoption of a national identity in the Turkish context and then provide a 
critical assessment of this process. 
In the first place, the adoption of national identity must have been, in 
one way or another, in the interests of the groups which imported it. 
Specifically, it must have been preceded by the dissatisfaction of these 
groups with the identity they had previously. A change of identity 
presupposed or created a crisis of identity. "Anomie" is the main 
reflection or the structural manifestation of this identity crisis. Very 
often anomie took the form of status-inconsistency which could be 
accompanied by a profound sense of insecurity and anxiety39 Usually, 
the main reason of this insecure position was the subtle shifts in 
legitimization. Because, in accordance with the prescriptions of the 
intellectuals and westenized elites, historically well-established 
collective representations and identities underwent modifications. 
However, the positions of the intellectuals were unclear. As Mary 
Matossian puts it: 
38Kellas,J.G. (1991) The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Macmillan, Lo pd on, 
p.15. 
39Greenfeld, L. op.cit. pp.14-15. 
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The first problem of the 'assaulted' intellectual is to assume a satisfactory 
posture vis-a-vis the West. The position taken is frequently ambigious 
embracing the polar extremes of xenophobia and xenophilia. The intellectual 
may resent the West, but since he is already at least partly Westernized, to reject 
the West completely would be to deny part of himself. 
The intellectual is appealed by discrepancies between the standard of living and 
'culture' of his own country, and those of modern Western nations. He feels that 
something must be done, and done fast. He is a man on the defensive, 
searching for new defensive weapons.40 
It may be argued that Turkish national sentiments emerged in the course 
of a search for new defensive weapons against the rising Western 
civilization. The Ottoman intellectual and bureaucratic elite in the 
second half of the nineteenth century found itself in a position which 
was --from a psychological point of view-- a perfect breeding ground for 
"ressentiment" 41 By adopting the Westen national idea as its model and 
by the desire to regain its past glories, the Ottoman state lacked the 
social conditions necessary for the implementation of this model, 
thereby making equality with the West impossible. The intellectuals in 
the empire were in a position to be personally wounded by the 
superiority of the West and to feel resentment generated by the relative 
position of the country. 
The early Ottoman patriotism indeed displayed unmistakable 
characteristics of ressentiment. Significantly, these characteristics are 
more salient particularly after the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
40Matossian,M."ldeologies of Delayed Development" in Nationalism, A.D.Smith and 
J.Hutchinson (ed) Oxford Univ.Press, Oxford, 1994, p.218. 
41 The term "ressentiment" is conceptualized by Liah Greenfeld. For her, it refers to a 
psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential 
envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings. It has a very similar meaning 
with 'anomie' and resentment. See Nationalism; Five Rooads to Modernity, Harvard 
Univ. Press, Massachussets 1992, pp.15-17. 
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with the era of the Young Ottomans. The rejection of the Western model 
was expressed in the blaming of its values, but also in their emphatic 
appropriation. That is, on the one hand , they accept the unblemished 
aspect of Western civilization, but on the other hand they reject its 
wicked side (moral values). This has caused an anomic situation since, 
there was no certain criteria that would measure the good and bad sides 
of the Western civilization. This torn situation has been preceded for 
long years in the Turkish tradition. The outstanding reflection of this 
mood constituted what I shall call the "trinities" of the intellectuals. For 
instance, Ziya Gokalp tried to synthesize three policies namely, 
Westernism, Turkism and lslamism. 
Since the late eighteenth century, nationalism has in many respects 
become the dominant political doctrine in the West. During this period, 
consciousness of national identity became a predominant force for 
constituting independent political structures. National loyality had a 
unifying and a restorative role and became a remedy for identity crises 
and fragmentations. In Western Europe, nationalism was necessary to 
provide a common identity against the anomalous situation of the 
transition period with the Industrial Revolution. In some ways, the 
growth of national identity has been influenced by religion. People were 
defining their identity and loyalty in terms of nationality. 
On the other hand in the East, especially in Ottoman/islamic world, 
religion was a unique and a solitary element constituting the common 
identity and it was a significant source of power. The dividing lines were 
not drawn according to nationalities, but according to religious ideas. 
Within the empire, "the basic loyalty of Muslims was to Islam, to the 
Islamic Empire that was its political embodiment, and to the dynasty, 
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legitimized by time and acceptance, that ruled over it. The discontented 
and the rebellious might seek a change of ministers, of sovereign ... they 
never sought to change the basis of statehood or corporate identity."42 
Religion functioned as a linking institution in the society: 
Religion was the mediating link between local social forces and the political 
structure. The process worked at two levels. The institution of religion was one 
where popular structures were linked with the Ottoman ruling institution, and 
religion provided the cultural fund which shaped ideals of political legitimacy 
among individuals. But religion was also the core of a much wider process of 
socialization than that connected with politics ... The same is true for norm-
formation: the institutional and symbolic aspects of Islam took over this 
function in the Middle East and in the Ottoman Empire ... Because of the gap in 
these linking institutions and because of the relative undifferentiatedness of 
Ottoman society, it assumed the reference-group functions ... For the population 
at large religion was a moral prop, something to lean on, a source of 
consolation, a patterning of life; for the ruling elite it was ... a matter related to 
the legitimacy of the state.43 
Therefore, nationalism emerged as a subsidiary identity against religion 
with a claim of a legitimate and autonomous Weltanschauung (world-
view). 
A relic of times when religion was the prime loyalty, the empire had survived 
into the era of nationalism, which undercut both the old inter-communal 
synthesis and ... egalitarianism.44 
42Lewis,B. (1964) The Middle East and the West, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington, 
p.72. 
43Mardin, S. (1971) "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution" in Int. Journal of 
Middle East Stud., Vol.2, pp.205-206. 
4 'Findley, C.V. (1989) Ottoman Civil Officialdom; a social history, Princeton Univ. 
Press, New Jersey. 
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This state of affairs enabled the individuals to be exposed to dual 
identity conflicting with each other. If explained in psychological terms, 
social schizophrenia and fragmented identity were the main reflections 
of this situation. In this sense, nationalism fragmented not only the 
existent legitimacy at the societal level, but also practically reduced the 
influence of the common element (religion), in the long run, which has 
been a fundamental agent as a political struggle against the West. 
Islamic authenticity was delinked from the corporate identity which was 
shared by society in general. 
I believe, the intellectuals and the political elite did not grasp the inner 
logic of the social, economic and political developments that took place 
in the West and the historical role of nationalism in the Western context. 
They had the imagination that nationalism and westernization would 
have the same effects in their countries. From the standpoint of its 
results, not its causes, regardless from the processes that formed 
nationalism in the European context, the intellectuals and the state 
elites voluntarily played an instrumental role in the adoption of this 
uprooted national identity. Moreover, Turkish nationalists were not very 
much interested in the theoretical peculiarities of nationalism. Instead of 
having philosophical and ideological considerations for constituting a 
systematic conceptual frame for nationalism, nation-state or its 
prerequisites (namely citizenship rights, social-contract theory, 
bourgeois, etc.) , their initial concerns were ,in a pragmatic way, to 
overcome the problems and discontents that threatened the very 
establishment of the State: 
The ideas they advocated were Western liberal ideas; constutionalism and 
parliamentary government. But it were not these ideas in themselves that· 
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appealed to them ... but these ideas as a means to strengthen and eventually 
save the Ottoman state. As Tarik Zafer Tunaya has remarked, their central 
preoccupation was with the question: Bu devlet nasil kurtulabilir? (How can this 
state be saved?). In other words they were ardent Ottoman nationalists.45• 
In the course of time, this attempt increasingly led to more systematic 
introduction and formulation of nationalism by the intellectuals. 
Although Turkish nationalism consisted primarily of political aspects of 
nationalism, during this period, nationalism manifested itself rather 
culturally46. The cultural nationalism, gradually, turned to a political one 
in order to accomodate to the requirements of establishing a new 
nation-state. 
It can be suggested that the most outstanding character of Turkish 
nationalism was its "foisted" nature. I would like to label the 
ambivalances and the paradoxes in the identity of Turkish nationalists (a 
situation common to the identity of all non-Western nationalists for 
Chatterjee and Gellner) as foisted identity. But, the reason why I use the 
word foisted is my disagreement with Chatterjee and Gellner in labelling 
nationalist identity as contradictory or inconsistent. Chatterjee and 
Gellner's theory of nationalism and contradictions in the thoughts of 
nationalist intellectuals are applicible to a certain extent to the Turkish 
case. I suggest that this model should be modified in applying it to the 
Turkish case regarding the following points: 
45Zurcher, E.J. The Unionist Factor, Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1984, p.22. 
46This kind of explanation also made by David Kuhner, but his conception of 'cultural 
aspect of Turkish nationalism' is different from my usage. For him, 'cultural' signifies 
a aoctrine wh1cn 1s equal to non-pa111c1pauon to a po1it1ca1 movement. 1 will exptain 
my consideration on this issue in following sections. However ,I partially agree with 
Kushner. See D.Kushner , The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, London, Frank 
Cass, 1977, p.98. 
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a) Ottoman nationalist intellectuals were different from the intellectuals 
in the colonial world in the sense that they were not reacting to a 
colonial rule. On the contrary, they were trying to increase the power of 
an independent political state vis a vis the expansion of the Western 
powers. 
b) Ambivalences and seeming paradoxes in their thinking should not be 
considered as contradictory or inconsistent. We should take into 
consideration the fact that there was a coherent and holistic purpose 
that keeps different ideological elements coexisting in one system of 
thought without contradiction such as the coexistence of elements 
Turkism, lslamism and Westernism in one national identity. This I would 
rather call as a "foisted identity". I use especially the term "foisted" 
because the nationalist identity was not constructed from above 
deliberately by the intellectuals and the state elites. They were rather in 
a search for new policies that would maintain and perpetuate the 
existent state and provide an effectiveness. They were loyal to their 
state and society. Because of that the new identity was mainly foisted to 
the previous identities without a contradiction. 
Though I believe that the foisted nature of national identity of Ottoman 
intellectuals is a common character of their way of thinking, I do not 
argue that the significance of each element was same for all 
intellectuals. On the contrary, I will argue that, for different intellectuals 
the meaning and significance of each foisted element vary accrding to 
their personal, political and pragmatic considerations. But, because of 
their intellectual fate, they could not ignore any element in their foisted 
identity and create a monolithic identity. 
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The new hypothetical "foisted identity" could not provide the emotional 
security in the society, since it has no historical roots. Furthermore, this 
invented national identity brought along secularism and westernization 
with itself. It simply could not fill the identity gap, due to its lack of 
legitimacy. Religion was also needed, but in a controlled manner. The 
three of them, namely religion, nationalism and westernization 
constituted a catastrophical balance that made itself felt for long time in 
Turkish history. 
In the first chapter, I will present the historical background of Turkish 
nationalism and the several dynamics that gave rise to the national 
sentiments in the Ottoman Empire among the intellectuals. Especially 
the Young Ottoman period will be dealt with for their utmost importance 
in the formation of Turkish national sentiments. They were also the 
forefather of Turkish nationalism. They were the first men who have 
introduced the Western Enlightenment ideas such as liberalism and 
patriotism to the Ottoman public. Although, it was the Ottoman virtues 
and the Ottoman Empire that the Young Ottomans wanted to revive, the 
germs of Turkish nationalism were contained within it47 For the first time 
in Turkish history, they divided the world of social institutions and 
practices into two domains --the material and the spiritual (or moral): 
The material is the domain of the outside, of the econo~y and of state-craft, of 
science and thecnology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority 
and. the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, Western superiority had to 
be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The 
spiritual, on the other hand, is the inner domain bearing the essential marks of 
cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the 
47 Davison, R. (1963) Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856-1876, Princeton Univ. Press, 
New Jersey, p. 221. 
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material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of 
one's spiritual culture.48 
This formula is, I think, a fundamental feature of Young Ottoman 
thought and it remained as an heritage among the later nationalists. 
The second chapter will mainly cope with the issues of Turkish 
nationalism disputed by the major representatives of Turkism, such as 
Ziya Gokalp and Yusuf Akcura. The Young Turk era and the Union and 
Progress Party will take a considerable place for their importance in 
articulating Turkish national sentiments. In both chapters, the identity 
problem, the positions of the intellectuals and the foisted nature of their 
nationalist ideology will constitute the chief bulwark of the study. 
48Chatterjee,P. (1993) The Nation and its Fragments, Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories, Princeton Univ. Press, New Jersey, p.6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH NATIONALISM 
2.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TANZIMAT REFORMS 
The prominent characteristics of Ottoman politics in the nineteenth 
century was formed by an attempt to respond or counter the growing 
domination of the Western powers and by a policy of Westernization. As 
Eric Jan Zurcher points out this policy was initiated by two motives 
both ultimately aiming at the same goal; the restoration of Ottoman 
power or the maintenance of the state. As Zurcher puts it: 
1. A strong desire to increase the efficiency of the administration of 
the Empire by the adoption of Western methods and institutions. 
2. To please the European states by effecting reforms and so to 
reduce the constant pressure of western countries49 
Ottoman politicians took the reforms aiming at westernization as a 
compromise with Europe and to increase the power of the state. That 
means, the reforms were seen as opportunistic moves to please the 
representatives of the Western powers and as a condition for diplomatic 
support. 
The most outstanding period of Westernization started with the 
implementation of the Tanzimat reforms. These reforms were all aimed 
at greater efficiency and centralization of the state machinery. With 
49Eric J.Zurcher, The Unionist Factor, Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1984, p.1. 
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these reforms, power was gradually concentrated in the hands of 
palace, imperial bureaucracy and the Babia/i. In order to attain this 
greater power, the bureaucracy, the army and the education facilities 
had to be enlarged and modernized so that new schools and training 
institutions based on Western models could be founded. Nonetheless, 
the reforms left the Ottoman state more authoritarian and monolithic 
than it had ever been.50 This period of westernization brought about with 
itself the modification in concepts and outlook which had eventually 
upset the very foundations of Ottoman social and political structure. 
The Western-originated concepts such as freedom, equality, nation and 
fatherland began to spread among some members of the Ottoman elite 
by means of some connections. These connections were established 
through Ottoman embassies in foreign countries, student missions to 
Europe, and foreign instructors and teachers invited to Turkey to staff 
new schools. 51 
This aspect of westernization was part of the drive toward secular equality given 
fonnal expression in Tanzimat refonns ~quality under law of all Ottoman 
subjects regardless of sect. The statesman hoped to create an "Ottomanism" 
which would counteract separatist nationalistic tendencies among the 
minorities and help to preserve the empire intact by winning stronger allegiance 
of all subjects to a beneficent imperial government. The official policy of 
Ottomanism encountered a major obstacle in Muslim objections to what they 
regarded as unnatural equality between true believers and subject unbelievers52 
Resistance against the Tanzimat was great. Especially, the conservative 
Muslims rejected them, since the reforms were in essence imitations of 
501bid. p.3. 
51 Kushner,D. op.cit. p.3. 
52Davison,R. (1984) Turkey; A Short History, The Eothen Press: Huntingdon, p.80. 
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the Christian West and they were the results of the European diplomatic 
pressure. 
There was much about the reforms to arouse "resentment" and dislike. The 
political, social and economic changes they involved seemed to offer some kind 
of threat to the interests of almost every group in Turkish society; to almost all 
they appeared as a triumph over Islam of the millennial Christian enemy in the 
West ... Military defeat and political humiliation had indeed shaken the torpid and 
complacement trust of the Turks in their own invincible and immutable 
superiority, but the ancient contempt for the barbarian infidel, where it yielded, 
often gave place to rancor rather than emulation.53 
Moreover, these reforms necessitated almost a total equality among the 
subjects of the Empire whether they were Christian or Muslim. The 
Turks had been mostly disturbed by this situation, since it dissappeared 
their privileged position in the Empire and it also had challenged their 
way of life, religious beliefs and the integrity and cohesiveness of the 
Ottoman society: 
The psychological block to change in the Tanzimat period came not only from 
the natural aversion to change, plus the natural reluctance to admit defects in 
the Turkish way of life and to copy the institutions of an alien Western society; it 
came also from the practical fact that this meant also copying the ways of the 
second-class subjects of the empire, the Christian minorities, who because of 
their religious and commercial affiliations with the West were sometimes ahead 
of Turks in their assimilation of western ideas and patterns of life ... Religious 
belief, the simple pride in Islam, reinforced this reluctance to change. The 
proposed reformes of the Tanzimat period, therefore, represented a threat to the 
established order, to the Muslim way, and to the integrity and cohesiveness of 
Turkish society.54 
53Lewis,B. (1964) The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford; London, p.127. 
54Davison, R. (1963) Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856-1876, Princeton Univ. Press, 
New Jersey, p.79. 
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More challenging and more important for later developments in the 
Empire was the opposition to the Tanzimat within the bureaucracy itself, 
which eventually became known as the movement of the "Young 
Ottomans". Their intellectual formation was certainly entirely 
Westernist. But they possessed a better knowledge that led to the 
Young Ottomans to elaborate the first systematic political ideology of 
the Middle East. Heavily inspired by the Western liberal ideas, their 
outstanding principle was Ottoman "patriotism"55 
These people, the foremost among whom were ibrahim ~inasi, Ziya 
Pa!}a, Nam1k Kemal and Ali Suavi inspired by liberal nationalist ideas, 
began to criticize the authoritarian character of the Tanzimat policies, as 
well as their superficiality. They compressed for more democratic forms 
of government and the introduction of an Ottoman Constitution and 
parliament. 
From the standpoint of Islamic teachings namely Koran and Sunnah, 
they argued that the Islamic state had originally been a democratic, 
constitutional institution but it is later changed by the tyranny of later 
rulers. This consideration was partly inspired by a genuine pride in their 
religion (all Young Ottomans were ardent Muslims) and wish to defend 
Islam against _West~rn criticism by showing that the Western civilization 
i 
actually derived from Islam or at least that the most desirable 
(unblemished) aspects of Western civilization had originally existed also 
in Islam. They supported the compatibility between the Islamic ideas 
and the Western science and technology. This attempt to reconcile the 
Western civilization with the Islamic thought has not been accepted only 
55Findley,C.V. (1980) Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire; The Sublime Port, 
1789-1922, Princeton Univ. Press, New Jersey, pp.216-217. 
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by the Young Ottomans bµt also nineteenth and twentieth century 
intellectuals throughout the world of Islam. 
According to Mardin, the Young Ottomans were at one and the same 
time the first men to make the ideas of the Enlightenment part of the 
intellectual equipment of the Turkish reading public. Furthermore, they 
were the first intellectuals who attempt to decipher a synthesis between 
the ideas of Enlightenment and lslam.56 However, their task was mainly 
arduous, due to the existent structure of the Ottoman state and society 
in their times; 
Up to the middle of the nineteenth century Turkey had remained outside the 
main stream of Western European intellectual development. Ottoman civilization 
was therefore deprived of the benefit of the political ideas that had gained 
currency in Europe during the Enlightenment. The political theory by which the 
rule of the Ottoman sultans was justified, for instance identified political power 
with the vicarage of God. In the European political theory of the nineteenth 
century, on the other hand, the separation of secular and religious power was 
axiomatic. Thus the adaptation of Western European political ideas to suit the 
needs of the Ottoman Empire, which young Ottomans attempted, was bound to 
run into difficulties.57 
56Mardin, ~. (1962) The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the 
Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, Priceton Univ. Press; New Jersey, p.3. 
571bid. p.4. 
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2.2 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF YOUNG OTTOMAN THOUGHT TO 
TURKISH NATIONALISM 
Western spirit of nationalism was the major political contribution of 
Europe to Ottoman/Turkish modernization. Such a concept was foreign 
to the Ottoman Empire where generally distinctions among peoples 
followed religious lines. Ottoman leaders traditionally served faith and 
state. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, for many people, 
the term 'Turk' had a somewhat derogatory connotation, hence certain 
intellectuals, particularly the Young Ottomans, opted for an Ottomanist 
type of nationalism. Their protonationalism and parochialism 
manifested itself in the formulation of the concept "watan". The use of 
the word watan {fatherland) in a political sense had the same meaning 
with the French patrie or the German Vaterland. Certainly, it was a 
consequence of the European influence and example. "For a long time, 
however, watan connoted not a true and fervent nationalism, but a spirit 
of patriotism ... It viewed with distress the shrinking boundaries of the 
Ottoman Empire and promoted a desire to defend those boundaries The 
spirit first of patriotism and later on nationalism was nurtured also by 
revulsion against European attacks and pressures, and by reaction 
against the nationalism of the rebellious Balkan peoples. By 1873, when 
Nam1k Kemal produced his drama entitled Vatan, the fatherland concept 
was charged with emotional content. This Fatherland was not yet fully 
"Turkish", it was still Ottoman. The emotional content was Islamic as 
well as patriotic"58 A song of Namik Kemal which was expressed in the 
play, entitled Vatan yahut Silistre (Fatherland or Silistre), very well 
shows the Ottomanist patriotic zeal: 
58Davison,R. (1990) Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923, The Impact of 
the West, University of Texas Press, Austin, p.88. 
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Blood and sword on our flag are flying, 
On our hills and plains roams no fear of dying, 
A lion in each part of our land is lying, 
We rejoice in the fray martyrs' lives to lay down, 
We are Ottomans, giving up life for renown59 
In his article, Namik Kemal explains what Vatan means for him: 
The Vatan does not consist of imaginary lines drawn on a map by the sword of a 
conqueror or the pen of scribe. It is a sacred idea, sprang from the union of 
many lofty sentiments, such as nation , freedom, welfare, brotherhood, property, 
sovereignty, respect for ancestors, love of family, memory of youth.60 
With this definition, he provides unconsciously a basis for the later 
emerging nationalism. Vatan freed itself from the religious and patriotic 
bonds and became clearly nationalist in the end of the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth century. During the Young Ottoman 
periods, it sought to promote Ottomanism among the various peoples 
and creeds of the imperial state. "Ottoman statesman attempted to 
inject affective appeal into the egalitarian policy and parry the separatist 
- nationalist threat by promoting a new concept of Ottomanism, no 
longer as the elite identity of the ruling class, but as an imperial supra 
nationalism. 61 The reform leaders felt it necessary to try to infuse into 
the Ottoman subjects a new kind of loyalty to the Ottoman fatherland, 
and to an "Ottoman nation" which would replace the old, narrow identity 
59Cited in, R.Davison (1963) Reform in the ... , p.299. 
60Cited in Lewis,B. (1992) "Watan" in The Impact of Western Nationalisms, Jehuda 
Reinharz and George L. Mosse (ed), Sage Publications, London. 
61 Findley,C.V. (1989) Ottoman Civil Officialdom; a social history, Princeton Univ. 
Press, New Jersey, p.34. 
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(loyalty) to the community and help prevent potential discontent and 
revolt. The new policy came to be known as Ottomanism. 62 
The patriotic sentiments of the Young Ottomans, especially that of 
Nam1k Kemal, closely connected with their romanticist ideas. For Hilmi 
Ziya Olken, Namik Kemal was influenced by romanticism and the 
contemporary literature of Europe. Particularly, the French romantics, 
like Victor Hugo, mostly affected his ideas. In the preface to Ce/aleddin 
Harzem§ah, he, had given the manifesto of Turkish romanticism. Yet, 
there was a big difference between the Western romanticism and 
Kemal's romanticism. Western romantics did not advocate uncertain 
notions of liberty and patrie. Rather, their ideas were based on a concret 
history of a certain nationality and a definite patrie such as French 
fatherland or German nation. On the other hand, Turkish romanticism 
initiated by Nam1k Kemal was based on an Islamic-Ottoman history in 
which the idea of an indefinite nationality and a plurality of nations were 
dominant. Nam1k Kemal's vatan was the Ottoman state and even the 
Islamic world. It had indefinite borders and had no connections with the 
Western patrie in which the concret and the return to the reality 
constituted the main theme. Successfull or not, Nam1k Kemal's 
romanticism was quite a new phenomenon for the country and for later 
generations. 63 
I believe, there is a close connection between the notion of the state and 
fatherland. The strong state tradition generally promoted the idea of 
fatherland. By the mid- nineteenth century, the association of fatherland 
62Kushner,D. op.cit.p.3. 
63Ulken, H.Z. (1992) Tiirkiye'de 9agda§ ... , pp.99-100. 
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(watan) with state (devlet) as something not only to be loved but also to 
save and to be served has become a common theme. 
An outstanding example of this connection of ideas can be seen in a 
letter of ibrahim ~inasi written to his mother from Paris in 1851: "I want 
to devote (or sacrifice) myself to the cause of my religion, state, 
fatherland, and nation (millet)"64 I believe, these kind of feelings stem 
from the fact that there had been a strong state tradition among the 
Turks. There are several historical reasons of this situation that might 
be traced back to the early formative years of the Ottoman state. But, 
there are also a certain socio-cultural dynamics. 
First of all, Turkish nation was seen as the prominent and inevitable 
constituent of the Empire, i.e. the owner of the Empire. The Turks were 
the only loyal element in it and constituted the chief bulwark and 
support of the state. This situation have led them to preserve and 
maintain the State. Traditionally, the notion of the "generalizing, 
integrating and legitimizing state"(strong state), has been an ineluctable 
concern for the Turks65• Turkish nationalist character is reminiscent of 
the German one in a sense that they both have strong "statist"(etatist) 
traditions. Although this analogy signifies an undeniable reality, I think 
there is an important difference between them. In German tradition, 
nationalism had been formed by the philosophers before the German 
state was established, that is, the nationality was clearly identified by 
the nation before the emergence of the nation-state. Germans' first 
national movement aimed at unifying all Germans in a single sovereign 
64Lewis,B. "Watan" ... p.173. 
65For the strong state tradition in Turkish history, see Metin Heper, "Gi..i~li..i Devlet ve 
Demokrasi". 
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political state. Their primary purpose was to be unified and to establish 
a state. In the Turkish case, nationalism had been formed after the 
dissolution of the State. The consideration of the "state" enabled them 
to constitute a nationalist ideology. In short, Germans were the nation 
seeking their state, and the Turks vice versa66 • Therefore, during the 
dissolution of the empire, while the other nations pursued the territorial 
self-determination and independent state belonged to their own, in the 
last moment, the Turks had an attempt to perpetuate this non-national 
state. So, the nationalist ideas became hardly approved. Instead of 
Turkism, until the last quarter of the 19th century, lslamism and 
Ottomanism prevailed among the Turks as an alternative remedy to the 
dissolution. During the latter part of the 19th century, for many people, 
the term "Turk" had a somewhat negative connotation, and thus the 
intellectuals searched for an "Ottomanist" type of nationalism67 • But "the 
very idea of nation, as it had been developed in the nineteenth-century 
Europe and advocated by so many nationalists of the Ottoman 
minorities, cannot have been ignored entirely by Ottoman intellectuals. 
Though Ottomanism promoted the idea of the motherland, with all 
subjects, regardless of religion and race, equal before the law and loyal 
to the same Ottoman dynasty, the refusal of the minority nationalists to 
accept that equality, the success of national unity movements in 
Germany and Italy, and nationalist aspirations of non-Turkish Muslim 
groups in the empire led to an increased awareness of the Turkish 
identity and almost forced the germination of Turkish nationalism"68 • 
66For this kind of evaluations see Ay~e Kad1oglu,"Devletini Arayan Millet". 
67 For more information see F.Georgeon, Tiirk Milliyet~iliginin Kokenleri, Yusuf 
Ak~ura (1876-1935), Yurt Yay. Ankara, tr. by Alev Er, 1986 p.14. 
68Shaw&Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.II, Cambridge 
Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1985, p.260. 
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I believe, the most influential contribution of the Young Ottoman thought 
to the later nationalists was the formulation of the trinities i.e. three 
policies. Certainly, this formulation was not their original intellectual 
product, rather it was the outcome of the problems and discontents of 
the reform period. One of the consequences of the reforms was the 
creation of several dilemmas or dichotomies in almost every field of life. 
In intellectual life, in politics, in administration, in social life etc. two 
sets of institutions, two sets of identities, two loyalties stood side by 
side.69 Ziya Pasa very well describes and reflects this dichotomy: 
To impute fanaticism to men of zeal 
To ascribe wisdom to men without religion is now the fashion 
Islam, they say, is a stumbling-block to the progress of the state 
This story was not known before, now it is the fashion 
Forgetting our religious loyalty in all our affairs 
Following Frankish ideas is now the fashion 70 
Nam1k Kemal was probably the most influential intellectual who 
diagnosed the psychological nature of this situation and considered it 
as a major obstacle to progress towards the establishment of a modern 
state. He attempted to synthesize the original and idealized forms of 
Islam, the idealized forms of the political institutions of the Ottoman 
tradition with the good (material) aspects of Western civilization which 
had given progress, prosperity, and superiority to the European nations. 
It is clear that there is a foisted identity in Nam1k Kemal's ideas which 
contains different element~ within it. For him, there was a compatibility 
between the Western civilization and Islamic ideas. Moreover, he 
69Berkes,N. (1959) "Translator's Introduction" in Ziya Gokalp, Turkish Nationalism and 
Western Civilization, trans. and ed. by Niyazi Berkes, New York, p.17. 
70Lewis,B. op.cit. p.139. 
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argued, all that is best in European civilization derived from or could be 
paralleled in classical Islamic civilization, and the Muslim, in adopting 
these things, was returning to what was deepest and most authentic in 
his own tradition. In his formulation, there was a combination of 
different elements each having its own function in the society: 
Islam, according to him, would provide the moral and legal bases of society; the 
Ottoman tradition of statecraft, together with its multinational and multireligious 
cosmopolitan policy of toleration, would be the political framework of the 
Ottoman (not Turkish) state; and Western civilization would furnish the material 
and practical methods and techniques to enable this system to survive in the 
contemporary world of power and economic progress.71 
In the course of time, this attempt at reconciliation among the elements 
that Nam1k Kemal had discussed gave rise to the formulation of the 
three ideological movements, namely lslamism, Ottomanism and 
Westernism. This formula of the trinity also became a model for the 
further representatives of Turkish nationalism. Now, I will mention 
shortly the trinities which have been shaped by the famous intellectuals 
of Turkish nationalism after Namik Kemal. 
As Westernization was making headway from the 1840 onwards, 
particularly among the educated, debates concerning the relative 
importance (and political advantages) of Pan-Islam, Ottomanism and 
Turkism continued for many years in various journals in Turkey (such as 
Turk Yurdu, i~tihad, Mecmua-i Ebuzziya, and more particularly in Turan 
etc.)72 While evaluating the efficiencies of these three policies, Yusuf 
71 Berkes,N. op.cit. p.18. 
72Landau,J. Pan-Turkism in Turkey; a study in Irredentism; C.Hurst&Company, 
London, 1981, p.28. For the most typical example of 'Pan-lslamism, Pan-Ottomanism 
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Akcura, pre-eminent representative of Pan-Turkism, proposed Pan-
Turkism as an alternative policy to Ottomanism and lslamism. "By 
basing the State on the Turkish-speaking peoples, he said, there was 
promise of resting the foundations of the Ottoman Empire on a faithful 
and cohesive nation, rather than on elements whose loyalty was 
questionable."73 His primary anxiety for this formulation was related also 
with the question: "How can this state be saved?" The sense of 
uniqueness and isolation which the Turks felt in their effort to hold and 
save the state together doubtless provided the most solid grounds for 
the development of a national identity.74 
In Uf Tarz-1 Siyaset, Yusuf Ak~ura dealt with three types of policy 
namely Ottomanism, Pan-Turkism and Pan-lslamism. Although Ak~ura 
chose one of these polices eventually, Gokalp does not accept any of 
these ways, but tries to combine certain basic ideas of each in his 
conception of Turkism. Gokalp took these concepts from the writings of 
Huseyinzade Ali who had summoned the Turks to Turkle§mek, 
lslamla~mak, Avrupahla§mak.75 By his motto Huseyinzade meant to be 
inspired by Turkish life, to worship God in accordance with the Muslim 
religion and to adopt the present-day European civilization.76 
Gokalp took these principles as the foundation of his teachings and 
elaborated them. His slogan was "the first dogma of our social 
and Pan-Turkism' debate. see Yusuf Ak!(ura, Or; Tarz-1 Siyaset, Turk Tarih Kurumu 
Basrmevi, Ankara, 2nd edition, 1987. 
73Kushner,D. The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, London, Frank Cass, 1977, 
p.5. 
74lbid, p.5. 
75Georgeon,F. op.cit. p. 154. 
76Heyd,U. op.cit. p.149. 
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catechism must be: "I am a member of Turkish nation, the Islamic 
community and Western civilization"'' 
Akc;ura maintained that these three policies to some extent were 
contradictory with each other. 7s On the other hand, Gokalp claimed that 
these basic elements were not only compatible but even mutually 
complementary. 79 In his opinion, the Turks should accept from Western 
civilization only its material achievements and scientific model, and 
from Islam its religious beliefs without its political, legal and social 
traditions. All the other elements of culture, and particularly all the 
emotional and moral values (maneviyat), except the religious ones, 
should be drawn from Turkish heritage.so 
According to Uriel Heyd, this rigid and artificial distinction lacked 
consistency and did not correspond to the reality of Modern Turkish life, 
since there is no proper place for Islam as a Third Element, it was 
superseded by modern European values. Gokalp's system, for Heyd, 
does not allow Islam any separate existence. With the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire, Islam gradually lost its value in Gokalp's teachings and 
became the junior partner in his trinity. The foundations of Kemalism 
were mainly Turkc;Uluk and Garpc;1hk, only Islam has been excluded from 
the trinity.s1 
77Gokalp,Z. The Principles ... , p.48. 
78Georgeon,F. op.cit. pp.35-45. 
79Heyd,U. op.cit. p.150. 
solbid., p.50. 
81 lbid., p.151. 
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If we summarize the contibutions of the Young Ottoman thought to the 
formation of Turkish Nationalism, we can specify that while their 
activities and struggles have not preceded so long, and prevented by 
the central authorities, their importance as ideologues was far greater 
than the survey of their activities would suggest. Despite the fact that 
their ideas were naive and unsophisticated, they saw more and further 
than most other intellectuals and state elites. The prescriptions and 
formulas they offered have been very influential among the Ottoman-
Turkish people. 
Their understanding of the problems of change in Ottoman society was deeper 
than that of the mechanicians of the Tanzimat and their ideal, if vague, was not 
an ignoble one. Many new and significant ideas first found Turkish expression 
in their writings, and their influence on the thought and action of the 
generations that followed was very gret indeed.82 
They introduced the ideas of patriotism and nationalism to the Ottoman 
muslims for the first time and tried to reconcile them with Islam, thus 
making these ideas acceptable to a Muslim public. They were the first 
men to attempt to synthesize Westernism with Ottoman culture. In short, 
for me, they played a crucial role either consciously or unconsciously in 
the shaping of the Turkish nationalist ideas. 
82 Lewis, B. op.cit. p.173. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FORMATION OF TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY 
3.1 THE YOUNG TURK ERA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH 
NATIONALISM 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the rise of nationalism in the 
Balkans made itself felt in other provinces of the empire. Many Muslim 
intellectuals began to be very sensitive to the steady decline of Islamic 
power and tried to find a plausible solution or practical policy to 
maintain and save their state against the increasing loss of the 
territories and the Western domination. Paradoxically, these thinkers 
were under the influence of European ideas, such as liberalism and 
nationalism and urged the adoption of these very ideas in the hope that 
the Ottoman state might regain its power as in the sixtieth or seventieth 
century. The religion which is formulated as Pan-lslamism by 
Abdulhamid II, for them, was inadequate to promote loyalty and unity. 
Instead, they offered Ottomanism and nationalism that would provide a 
defensive weapon against what they called as infidels. 
These intellectuals, mostly inspired by the Young Ottoman ideas, in 
order to escape from so-called despotism of Hamidian regime, started 
leaving the country, for proceeding with their activities against the 
Ottoman government and also for further education in one of the 
European capitals, especially Paris, without the fear of surveillance. In 
Paris, these intellectuals found some small communities already formed 
by the liberal Ottomans. Later on, these intellectuals began to call 
themselves as Young Turks, after the name of a newspaper published 
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by Halil Ganem, called La Jeune Turquie (Young Turkey). One of the 
outstanding persons among the Young Turks was Ahmet R1za who 
shortly became the leader of the young conspirators. He had been 
attracted by the philosophy of Auguste Comte, and he soon became a 
familiar figure in Positivist circles in Paris and, at the same time, the 
founder of a periodical Mechveret (Consultation). In a short time, 
Mechveret became the official organ of the Young Turks. The motto of 
the periodical was the famous positivist jargon "Union and Progress". In 
December 3, 1895 Mechveret declared the aims of the society for its 
readers: 
"The program which follows explains with great clarity the line of conduct 
which we have traced for ourselves and the goal which we wish to attain. 
We have assured ourselves of the collaboration of certain personalities whose 
ardent desire is to see the former bonds of harmony and good friendship with 
the Ottomans taken up again and renewed. 
We wish to work not to overthrow the reigning dynasty, which we consider 
necessary to the maintenance of good order, but to propagate the notion of 
progress of which we desire the peaceful triumph. Our motto being "Order and 
Progress", we have a horror of concessions obtained by violence. 
We demand reforms, not especially for this or that province, but for the entire 
Empire, not in favor of a single nationality, but in favor of all the Ottomans, be 
they Jews, Christians, or Moslems. 
We wish to advance in the path of civilization, but we declare resolutely, we do 
not wish to advance other than in fortifying the Ottoman element and in 
respecting its own condition of existence. 
We are determined to guard the originality of our oriental civilization and, for 
this reason, to borrow from the Occident only the general results of their 
scientific evolution, only the things truly assimilable and necessary to guide a 
people in its march towards liberty. 
We are opposed to the substitution of direct intervention by the foreign 
powers for Ottoman authority. This is not from fanaticism, because, for us, the 
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religious question is a private affair -but from a legitimate sentiment of civil and 
national dignity.83 
Although this program is mostly the work of Ahmet R1za than the society 
in general,84 it was the common outlook of the Young Turks to the 
existent problems. R1za and his associates were mainly trying to 
"Ottomanize" the subjects of the Empire rather than promoting the idea 
of nationalism. This was an important phenomenon indicating their 
appeal to save the integrity and unity of the empire. The general 
Ottomanistic character of the intellectuals remained dominant until the 
beginning of the Balkan Wars, despite the opposition views of certain 
elements such as nationalists and lslamists. Under one identity there 
were several identities coexisting together as foisted. 
This program signifies another phenomenon that the problem of finding 
the right path of civilization to follow was an initial concern for the 
intellectuals. It is asserted that they wished to advance in the path of 
civilization, but the meaning of civilization is not clear. On the one hand, 
the "originality" of their Oriental civilization would be kept, on the other 
hand the developments in the scientific field would be taken from the 
Occidental civilization as long as they were assimilable and favorable to 
the march towards liberty. It seems quite paradoxical: the search was 
mainly for a regeneration of the civilizational culture, adapted to the 
requirements of science, liberty and progress/evolution, but retaining at 
the same time its "originality"85 • Hence, it is very difficult to refer to an 
83Ramsour, E.E. pp.24-25. 
84lbid. p.25. 
851 was inspired mostly from Partha Chatterjee's arguments on the distinctiveness of 
the national culture in these statements. In fact, he was writing in the context of 
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originality or distinctiveness of the national culture because the 
elements of Western civilization determine the local elements. As it is 
clear, the intellectuals had ardent sentiments in order to overcome the 
problems and uneasiness that would lead to the dissolution of the unity 
of their state. 
Apart from the society gathered around Mechveret, there were various 
people that had claimed different sorts of ideas. Mizanci Murat Bey, 
editor of the Mizan, was also a prominent figure among Young Turks. In 
his article Le Palais de Yildiz, Murat Bey offered more practical and 
concrete administrative and bureaucratic reforms and prescriptions 
than the relatively abstract program of Mechveret. Due to the fact that 
his implicit acceptance of the European intervention for providing the 
reforms in the empire and his assumption that it was not sufficient to 
regain the constitution of 1876, some of the Young Turks mainly 
criticized him86• Nevertheless, Murat Bey remained a notorious character 
both by his partial contributions to the Turkish nationalism in Mizan and 
his attempts to prevail the Western ideas of liberty, progress and 
revolution in order to change the structural basis of the empire.87 
nationalism, but I think it is also meaningful in civilizational context. For more 
infonnation see Partha Chatterjee, (1993) Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: 
a derivative discourse, Univ. of Minnesota Press. 
86Mardin, ~. (1992) Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908, lleti~im Yaymlan, Istanbul, 
p.96. 
8'He gave an remarkable importance to the tenn "Turk" in his writings. In Mizan there 
were several articles that asserted the significance of the Turkish language and 
Turkishness: "Araplann her ti.irH.i hikem ve bedaini isti~are edelim, fakat Ti.irk 
oldugumuzu ... unutmayahm." see Serif Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, p.114, 
However the main trend of Mizan was Ottomanist and it was opposed to the 
nationalist tendecies. For instance, Mizan objected to the use of "Albanian Muslims" 
of the newspaper Sabah instead of using "Muslims" alone, and the tenn "Albanian" 
became the focus of a heated debate between these two nawspapers. See David 
Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, p.25. 
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The other person who have played a greater role in the formation of the 
Western liberal ideas in the empire was Prens Sabahaddin. His ideas 
differed from the other Young Turk leaders in various senses. First of 
all, he was a true liberal and his ideas on liberalism had strong 
philosophical implications that can be traced back to the English 
tradition of liberalism. Secondly, he was totally against the Hamidian 
regime and was in the favor of interventions of great powers. He 
favoured a minimal, decentralized government with as much room as 
possible for private initiative and free enterprise, which he saw the 
motor of progress. Unlike the other Young Turks, he was not against the 
commercial and political domination and influence of the European 
countries in the Empire if it would accelerate its development.BB His 
ideas were in considerable opposition with the centralized government. 
He formed Te§ebbiisii $ahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (the League 
for Private Initiative and Decentralization) in Paris in order to attain his 
goals. For Mardin, the ideas of Sabahaddin were not so original and 
new. His attempts to create an "effective citizen" (verimli vatandas) had 
been a recurrent ideal since 1870s on the part of the intellectuals. The 
idea that in order to be successful in modernization, first of all, it is 
necessary to increase the educational levels of the citizens, was quite 
widespread. B9 
With the increasing effects of Prens Sabahaddin in Paris among some 
Young Turks led to a polarization and fragmentation. This fragmentation 
can be seen at the first "Congress of Ottoman Liberals" which was held 
in Paris in February, at the invitation of Prince Sabahaddin.90 Since, the 
BBzurcher, E.J. The Unionist Factor, p.17. 
89Mardin, S. op.cit., p.299. 
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ideas of Ahmed R1za and his association were tending towards 
centralization and Ottoman-Muslim patriotism and they were adverse to 
the foreign interference in the affairs of the Empire in any form, they 
were in a disagreement with Sabahaddin and his followers. Therefore, 
there began to appear two fractions between them. Moreover, beside 
these fragmentation, there were several other divisions which ran deep 
and were to play a part in the politics after the constitutional revolution 
of 1908. 
Until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, these divided ideas had 
acquired more definite and specific forms and were specified in quite 
systematic manners by some certain figures and publications. The 
common purpose of these currents were to find remedies for preventing 
the dissolution of the Empire. There were three main currents at that 
time namely Pan-lslamists, Westernists and Turkists. 
The pan-lslamists, mainly represented by Sait Halim Pa~a, M. 
$emseddin, Musa Kaz1m and Hac1 Fehim91 , maintained that the Empire 
had lost its power due to the increasing removal of the Islamic doctrines 
and practices from the institutions of the government. For them, like the 
Young Ottomans, there was a compatibility between the Islamic 
90Zlircher, E.J. op.cit. p.17. In the Congress Sabahaddin's decleration had more 
Ottomaist and pluralist implications: 
"It must be thoroughly understood that the Turks who constitute today the majority in 
the Empire, ask nothing for themselves which they do not ask also, and in the same 
measure, for all their compatriots, Moslem and non-Moslem ... 
We reiterate: the reforms whose application we demand in our country and for whose 
execution we are working with all our power, we do not demand them for such and 
such a people, such and such a religion, to the exclusion of such and such others: we 
demand them for all the Ottomans without exception ... " see Ernest E. Ramsaur, op.cit. 
p.67. 
91 See Kemal Karpat (1967) Turk Demokrasi Tarihi: Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kiiltiirel 
Deger/er,istanbul, p.24. 
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teachings and the Western science and technology. For the 
development of the Empire, it was necessary to turn back to the pre-
eminent fundamental Islamic ideas. As a believer in the universality of 
Islam, they were in opposition with the Turkists who wished to form a 
national society in a narrow sense92• 
The leading Westernists of the Young Turks were Abdullah Cevdet, 
Celal Nuri, SUleyman Nazif, K11tczade Hakk1 and Ahmed Muhtar. Their 
foremost aim was to educate, civilize and enlighten the "people" and to 
integrate the Ottoman masses to the contemporary civilization93• They 
were complaining about the ignorance of the people. If this problem was 
to be overcome by abolishing the fatalist and supernatural beliefs and 
constructing the cause-effect relationship of the events, the uneasiness 
and discontents taking place in the Empire would have been solved. 
They have supported the replacement of the sheriah laws by the civil 
laws, and that of the Arabic letters by the Latin alphabet, the 
abandonment of the religious schools in order to remove the fatalist 
world view, and the establishment of a national economy and 
industrialization94• Furthermore, they were advocating an Ottomanist 
type of policy, rather than nationalist. 
921bid., p.24. 
93A poem by Abdullah Cevdet very well summarizes this attempt: 
Sizi aydmlatmaya !;3h~hm gece gi.indi.iz 
Aydan gi.ine~e gittim, gi.ine~ten aya geldim 
Peygamberlervaatederlercennettibi.irdi.inyada 
Ben size bu di.inyay1 cennet yapmaya geldim 
See ~erif Mardin, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, p.221. 
94Karpat, K. op.cit. p.26. 
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The third and the most significant ideology developed in the Young Turk 
era was nationalism. This policy appeared primarily in the field of 
literature and merely had some cultural dimensions at the beginning. In 
some newspapers and journals, certain intellectuals began to remark on 
the importance of language for the preservation of the national culture, 
and the significance of purifying the language. The movement of 
Edebiyat-1 Cedide (New Literature) centered around the magazine 
Servet-i Fiinun was the first representative of that ideas. ~emseddin 
Sarni, for instance, argued: 
The first symbol of a nation and a race, its foundation, and its common 
property, shared equally by all its members, is the language in which it speaks. 
People speaking one language constitute one nation and one race. Each people 
and nation must therefore first of all bring order its language95• 
In the Hamidian period a great consideration was given to the national 
aspect of the role of the language: Revising the Turkish language, its 
structure, vocabulary etc. was the prerequisite to the preservation of the 
Turkish nationality. If it did not so, it would also cause to the elimination 
of nationality (mahv-1 kavmiyet). In this sense, the journalist and writer 
Said Bey's statement is very interesting: "Let the one who seeks Arabic 
go to the Arabs, those who seek Persian, to the Persians, and the 
'Frenks' to 'Frengistan'; but we are Turks and we need Turkish." 96 
Beside these developments in the field of language, there were other 
attempts that stimulated the national sentiments of the Turks. A number 
of European Turcologist began to find out the Turkish past, their 
historical background in the great Central Asian civilization, and the 
95Kushner, D. op.cit. p.62. 
96 lbid., p.63. 
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importance of their language and culture in the history. They have 
written several books that signified the great and covered 
accomplishments of the Turks in history. A.J. de Guignes, A.L.David, 
Mustafa Celaleddin Pa~a, Arminius Vambery and Leon Cahun were the 
most famous scholars who have attempted to discover the Turkish 
past97 • The scholarly researches of Orientalists acquainted Ottoman 
Turks with their ancient history and language, and with the Turks 
outside of the Empire. 
On the other hand, these studies had not enough reflections within the 
Empire. However, the main impetus to the increasing Ottoman 
acquaintance with Turks living outside the Empire was the move of 
intellectuals and scholars from Russia into the Ottoman Empire, 
generally toward the end of the nineteenth century. In a short period, 
these men became very influential in the cultural and political domains 
in the Empire and introduced the people with the fruits of long years of 
intellectual revival in the Muslim community of Russia98 , and they have 
played a greater role in the formation of Turkish nationalism. The 
national awakening of the Turks in Russia had started several years 
before than that of the Turks in the Ottoman empire as a reaction to the 
Russian domination and pressures. The Turkish intellectual activities 
which were centered mainly in the Crimea and Kazan, were influenced 
by Western liberal ideas, Islamic modernization thoughts of Jamaladdin 
Al-Afghani, Muhammed Abduh and Abdurrahman Al-Kawakibi 99 as well 
97Shaw&Shaw (1985), History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.2, 
Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, p.261. 
98Kushner, D. op.cit., p.12. 
99Kmmh, Hakan. (1994) National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean 
Tatars:1905-1916, p.57. 
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as the writings of Young Ottomans. The most outstanding figure of this 
movement was Ismail Bey Gasp1rah whose newspaper, Tercuman, 
established in Crimea in 1883 which became the longest-lasting and 
certainly the most influential newspaper among the Muslims of the 
Russian Empire. He also established an educational reform program, the 
"New Method" (Usu/-u Cedid) which was, in a course of time, turned out 
to be the general appellation of all reformist-nationalist movements 
among the Turks of the Russian Empire100• He emphasized the unity of 
all the Turks in the face of Russian nationalism and tried to develop a 
common literary dialect and a unification of languages that could be 
understood by all 101 • Moreover, Gasp1rah "envisioned a profound 
coalition of the Muslim Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire on the 
basis of a common ethno-national and religious consciousness, and 
sought to reform their societies and remedy the current maladies 
through modernism. A national unity based on a combined ethno-
linguistic and Islamic platform, and a transformation and reconstruction 
of society along modern lines, were the inseparable elements of 
Gasp1rah's program." 102 Although his attempts were not directly related 
to the construction of a pure nationalism, he had considerable 
contributions to the development of Turkism through the followers that 
he had inspired. Yusuf Akl!ura is the most important disciple of 
Gaspirah who had spent most of his life for the formation of the Turkish 
nationalism103 • Another Russia originated intellectual was an 
Azerbaycani, Ahmed Agayev (Agaoglu), studied in Paris, contacted with 
1001bid. p.62. 
101 Shaw&Shaw, op.cit., p.261. 
102Kinmh, H. op.cit., p.50. 
1031 will deal with the ideas of Aki;ura in detail in the following pages. 
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Ahmed R1za and other leaders of the Young Turks and started to publish 
a daily newspaper, ir§ad, in 1906. Eventually , he played a significant 
role in rising Turkish nationalism in the empire after 1908 revolution. 
Turkish nationalism in the Young Turk era can be evaluated in two time 
period. The first one is the opposition years between 1889-1908. In this 
period Turkish nationalism could not manifest itself evidently. Because, 
with the expectation to get their independence after victory, the 
minorities were supporting the Young Turks as opposed to the 
Hamidian regime. Moreover, the Young Turks did not see a benefit in 
dissociating themselves from the minorities by supporting nationalism 
manifestly104• Since, "a unifying force in a society enjoying cohesion and 
social solidarity, nationalism can prove disruptive in a population as 
composite as the Ottoman. It was feared that adoption of nationalism 
might tempt the non-Muslim communities to seek their salvation in the 
collapse rather than in the perpetuation of the structure under which 
they lived105• They rather tended to incline towards Ottomanism, in order 
not to lose the support of minorities. 
3.2 THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION 
The second period was between the years 1908-1913 in which Young 
Turks gained the power in the empire. For dealing with the nationalist 
attitudes of the Young Turks in this time period, it should be 
irretrievably mentioned about the Committee of Union and Progress and 
its so-called Turkification policies. In May 1887, Kazim Nami Duru and 
104Karpat, K. op.cit., p.27. 
105Khadduri, M. (1983) Political Trends in the Arab Worlds: The Role of Ideas and Ideals 
in Politics,Greenwood Press, Westport, p. 14. 
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five fellow students formed a group called the Society of Union and 
Progress (lttihad ve Terakki Cemiyet1). It does not seem to have lasted 
too long, but two years later, in May 1889, an Albanian Muslim named 
Ibrahim Temo, joined with a Circassian student, Mehmet Resit, and two 
Kurds, Abdullah Cevdet and Ishak Sukuti, in order to reconstitute the 
Ottoman Society of Union (/ttihad-i Osmani Cemiyet1) and then they 
renewed its name as the Ottoman Society of Union and Progress 
( Osmanli /ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyet1). They called for a program of 
constitutionalism, Ottomanism and freedom, and a demand to replace 
the sultan with one of his brothers106'. 
In a course of time, the CUP had spread around the empire, and the 
opposition groups began to label themselves with the name of the 
committee. With the increasing influence of the committee, sultan's 
police kept the CUP well suppressed in and around the capital after 
1897. However, the conditions nurtured and strengthened its cause, 
especially among the students, the lower officer ranks in the army, some 
bureaucrats and intellectuals. There emerged several underground 
organizations against the sultan's policies who wished to reestablish 
the constitution. Consequently, Abdulhamid could not stand the 
opposition, uprisings and rebels from almost all segments of the 
society, and in 1908 he recalled the Parliament in order to establish a 
constitutional government. Without any real revolution, without any 
violence and demonstrations, the Young Turk Revolution had taken 
place on July 23. "The sultan declared that he had suspended the 
Parliament until the work of modernization was completed and the time 
had now come for it to meet again so it could share in the difficult task 
106Shaw&Shaw, op.cit. p.256. 
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of saving the empire from its enemies107." Although the intellectuals 
outside the empire had indirect contributions, the revolution of 1908, 
especially, was the result of the work of groups working inside the 
Empire. In contrast with the opposition groups abroad, "generally the 
members of these opposition groups do not seem to have been much 
concerned with theoretical approaches to the reforms they wanted, nor 
with the building of a coherent ideology. 108" 
3.3 COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS 
AND 
THE TURKIFICATION POLICIES 
With the Young Turk Revolution, the reign of Abdulhamid II was over, 
and the era of CUP started. I do not want to go into detail by giving all 
the historical and political events taking place in the era of CUP. Rather, 
this thesis primarily aims at elucidating the policies of CUP which are 
directly related with nationalism and its attitudes towards the minorities. 
The new rulers came across with three possible policies of action when 
they were in power: (1) Pan -lslamism, (2) Ottoman ism, and (3) Turkish 
nationalism, while faced with the problem of what national policy to 
formulate for the maintenance of unity. A clear and coherent policy was 
never adopted officially due to the complexities of the situation and the 
conflicting views of the leaders. "The new generation, in the majority, 
acting under the influence of nationalist thinkers, seem to have favored 
Turkish nationalism. Pan-lslamism was discredited because it failed to 
1071bid., p.267. 
108Zurcher, E.J. op.cit., p.21. 
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rehabilitate Islam under Hamidian rule, while Ottomanism was put 
forward too late to create cohesion among diverse groups who had 
adopted conflicting national identities. It was Turkish nationalism which 
gradually came to dominate the new rulers and they sought to impose 
new loyalties on all the non-Turkish elements of the empire with a policy 
of Turkification" 109• 
At this juncture, the so-called Turkification policies of the CUP in their 
power is an important criteria that signifies the shift of their attitudes 
towards the issue of nationalism from the pluralistic policy of 
Ottomanism to the separatist national course of action after 1908. 
Conventional interpretations on this issue argue that the Turkification 
(Turkle~tirme) policies of Ottoman governments initiated by Abdulhamid 
II and proceeded during the Committee of Union and Progress(CUP). 
These policies stimulated the national sentiments of the non-Turks and 
they were responsible for the awakening of the national identity of 
peoples such as the Arabs. 110 The other argument say that Abdulhamid 
pursued a policy of centralization and limited Turkification in the local 
administration: a policy of centralization. Then, the CUP changed this 
situation, it not only continued Abdulhamid's centralization and 
Turkification policies but also tried to expand and broaden these 
policies. As a result the increased centralization and Turkification 
without incorporation had stimulated, especially, the Arab nationalism 
and the Arab hostility to the Ottoman empire.111 Dawn, contrarily, 
109Khadduri, M. op.cit., p.15. 
11 °For the wide range of infonnation on these interpretations see Rashid Khalidi and 
Lisa Anderson (ed.) The Origins of Arab Nationalism, Colombia Univ. Press, New York, 
1991. 
111 Haddad, M. op.cit. p.204. 
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asserted that "Arabism was not a response to Turkification, and it 
remained a minority tendency in Syria and the Arab world generally until 
1918.112" The other challenge to the conventional interpretations is that 
there was not a Turkification policy in the reign of Abdulhamit, but 
rather it was a policy of centralization, unification and modernization of 
the fragmented elements of the Ottoman Empire. His education 
programme was mainly related with this problematic. On the other hand, 
it is true that with the CUP government the process of centralization, 
secularization and Turkification became dominant. For ~OkrO Hanioglu, 
the CUP leaders had a strongly nationalist orientation: 
In light of the attitudes of the many Young Turk leaders toward the Arabs ... it is 
not a great surprise that after 1908 a conflict developed between Arab 
nationalists, who came to think of the Turks as oppressors, and the Young 
Turks, who thought Turks were the superior race in the Middle East and had the 
right to govern the Arabs113 
Khalidi also reaffirms the impact of CUP policies "that were perceived 
by many Arabs as being motivated by Turkish nationalism in spurring 
the growth of Arabism114" Perhaps the failure of the CUP in World War I 
left the dominant faction of the Arab elite with no alternative to 
Arabism. 115 However, the CUP had no consistent policy towards the 
112Khalidi, R. "The origins of Arab Nationalism:lntroduction" in Rashid Khalidi and 
Lisa Anderson (ed.) The Origins of Arab Nationalism, Colombia Univ. Press, New York 
p. xii and also see Ernest C. Dawn D (1973) From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on 
the Origins of Arab Nationalism, Univ. of lllionis Press, Chicago, pp.122-147. 
113Hanioglu,M.~. (1991) "The Young Turks and the Arabs Before the Revolution of 
1908" in Rashid Khalidi and Lisa Anderson (ed.) The Origins of Arab Nationalism, 
Colombia Univ. Press, New York p.44. 
114Khalidi, R. op.cit. p.xiii. 
115Cleveland, William L.(1971) The Making of an Arab Nationalist:Ottomanism and 
Arabism in the life and thought of Sati a/-Husri, Princeton Univ. Press, New Jersey, 
p.46. 
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peoples of the empire, they "pursued a number of approaches that 
emphasized Turkish nationalism, Ottomanism and Pan-lslamism in 
different geographical areas116" 
Although the common views about the nationalist attitudes of the Young 
Turks argue that their nationalistic feeling increased, even emerged, 
after the 1908 Revolution, Hanioglu disagree with these arguments, and 
argues that Turkish nationalism developed well before the 1908 
Revolution among the Young Turks: "It is obvious that the Young Turks 
had strong nationalistic feeling even before the Young Turk revolution 
of 1908. Contrary to commonly held views, this policy did not begin until 
after the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. In their early opposition years, they 
claimed that the Turks had certain rights because they were the majority 
in the empire, just as Austrians had rights in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire or the Russians in the Russian Empire. A number of prominent 
members of the CUP, moreover, authored articles that claimed that only 
Turks were real Ottomans or that the Ottoman language was Turkish. 
Also, in the official organs of the CUP, Turks were described as an 
ethnically different group from Arabs or other Muslim groups in the 
empire, such as Albanians." 117 Ernest Dawn criticizes this view and 
supports the conventional interpretations: 
While Turkism had its advocates before 1908, they were a decided minority and the 
ideology of the CUP before 1908 was Ottomanist, without any Turkish bias ... The 
Unionists continued to be Ottomanists ideologically for a considerable time after 
1908 ... The most important Unionist ideologist, Ziya Gokalp, did not become an active 
116Haddad, M. op.cit. p.214. 
117Hanioglu, ~·op.cit., p.43. 
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advocate of Turkism until 1913 or so, and he remained a believer in Ottomanism until 
late in World War 1118 
Indeed) after the Balkan and Tripoli Wars where the Ottoman army were 
defeated and lost of the enormous amount of territories) the nationalist 
aspirations of the intellectuals and the Ottoman government increased. 
"With the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, in which most remaining 
Ottoman Christians and even the largely Muslim Albanians broke away 
from the Empire) the leading members of the governing Committee of 
Union and Progress embraced a Turkish nationalist and even Pan-
Turkist position.ll9" Since, the expectations to preserve the unity of the 
empire had vanished with the increasing loss of the territories and with 
the rising nationalist movements of the non-Turkish nations and the 
Ottoman public opinion joined the Turkish nationalists in abonding 
Ottomanism in favor of Turkism. The Turks pragmatically became aware 
of their potentials to overcome the maladies of the empire. That isJ the 
understanding that 'the problems of the Turks can only be solved by the 
Turkish nation' became dominant in the minds of the people. Meanwhile, 
the policy of Turkism gained an enormous support , and the fellow of 
Turkism who had not been advocated by the majority before, achieved a 
great opportunity. At this pointJ Ziya Gokalp appeared as an outstanding 
theoretician of Turkish nationalism and he gained more adherents 
among the Turkish intellectuals. Particularly influential in developing the 
ideological basis of Turkish nationalism, his works contributed to the 
ll8Dawn, E. op.cit., p.18. 
119Rose, J.A. (1981) "Politics, Religion and Ethnic Identity in Turkey", in Religion and 
Politics in the Middle East, Michael Curtis (ed.), Westview Press. Boulder, Colarado, 
p.328. 
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intellectual development of the empire in its latter days and of the 
Turkish Republic that followed. 120 
3.4 ZiYA GOKALP AND HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF TURKISM 
With the aid of modern sociology, especially of Durkheimian sociology, 
Gokalp was able to systematize ideas into a coherent doctrine of 
Turkism. In his program he gave ample consideration to the socio-
economic reform of Turkish life as well as to questions of leadership 
and government.121 He turned from Ottomanism to Turkism, from the 
community of peoples living under Ottoman rule and in the brotherhood 
of Islam to the assumed racial and cultural unity of all the populations 
speaking a Turkish language and looking upon Turan as their common 
home.122 
The recurrent theme in Gokalp's writings was the question of how the 
Turks should adopt Western civilization, and how this effort should be 
harmonized with the Turks' two historic traditions, i.e. their Turkish and 
Islamic backgrounds; or, in other words, what the Turks as a nation and 
Islam as their religion would look like under the conditions of 
contemporary civilization123 
120shaw&Shaw, History of the Ottoman ... , p.301. 
121 Kushner,D. The Rise of ... , p.99. 
122Kohn,H. The Age of Nationalism, p.106. 
123Gokalp,Z. Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, trans. and ed. by Niyazi 
Berkes, New York, 1959, p.13. 
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In early writings of Gokalp, he saw the Western civilization as a negative 
and destructive element which would be harmful to muslim's own 
culture: Because of the existence of certain conditions peculiar to our 
life, we muslims could not imitate the ready-made norms of Europe and 
its standardized ways of living. For us, it was necessary to leave them to 
have them made to order, like tailored suits, to fit our own body." 124 He 
declares that the Western civilization is based on rotten and decaying 
foundations and is doomed to ruin 125• This negative approach to Western 
civilization increasingly turned to a positive approval, suffering the huge 
loss of territory of the empire. As I have implied earlier, with the 
vanishing expectations to save the state, Ottomanist patriotism among 
the intellectuals was replaced by a new kind of national sentiment, i.e., 
Turkish nationalism. Paradoxically, this situation also enabled them to 
turn their face from the East to the West. We can see this process 
exactly in the life of Ziya Gokalp. "The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 
the Tripoli and Balkan wars made him painfully aware that European 
civilization must not be underrated"126 and instead of Oriental theocratic 
civilization Turkish nation must follow the Western secular civilization. 
Then he came to the conclusion that: " ... Ottoman civilization, being a 
part of Eastern civilization, will be destroyed in any case, to be replaced 
by Islamic religion and Turkish culture on the one hand and by Western 
civilization on the other. The mission of Turkism is to seek out the 
Turkish culture that has remained only among the people and to graft 
onto it Western civilization its entirety and in a viable form." 12i. The 
1241bid., p.59. 
1251bid., p.60. 
126Heyd,U. The Foundations ... , p.79. 
127Gokalp,Z. The Principles of Turkism, trans. and an not. by Robert Deveroux, Leiden, 
E.J.Brill, 1968, p.33. 
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attempts to reconcile the Turkish/Islamic culture with the 'alien' Western 
culture were constituting a big dilemma for both the society and the 
intellectuals; 
Western-oriented modernization efforts, throughout, not only elicited opposition 
and intennittent revolts from the traditional sectors of the Ottoman society, but 
also posed agonizing intellectual dilemmas for the modernizers themselves. To 
reconcile Western concepts and practices with traditional Islamic and later 
Turkish values was not an easy undertaking. The result was, invariably, either 
shallow eclecticism or internally contradictory combination. In this 
respect ... Ziya Gokalp was to stand out as the originator of the least inconsistent 
synthesis128 
Actually, this eclecticism and combination indicates the foisted 
character of Gokalp's ideology. Though there are seeming paradoxes 
and contradictions in his formula, these different elements were 
coexisting in harmony and they constituted a coherent identity. 
In Gokalp's terminology, culture and civilization are two closely related 
and complementary traits of social reality. These concepts occupied a 
major position in his thinking. For him, civilizational elements assume 
meaning and function in the life of human beings only when they enter 
into the service of culture. Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes 
merely a matter of mechanical imitation. According to him this situation 
very well fits to the position of the Turkish nation where civilization had 
come to be a mere skeleton detoriating and destroying all cultural flesh 
and blood of the social body. When the Western civilization manifested 
itself to the Turkish nation, this deceased skeleton lost all meaning and 
128Parla, T. op.cit., p.2. 
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creativity. To Gokalp, the reason for the anomalous situation in Turkey 
was a lack of adjustment between these two aspects of social life.129 
Gokalp's considerations on nation and nationality were mainly adapted 
by Durkheim's sociology. He especially modified Durkheim's theory in a 
decisive and rather arbitrary way. For Durkheim's "society" he 
substituted "nation" for instance. Moreover, he transferred to the nation 
all the divine qualities he had found in society, replacing the belief in 
God by the belief in the nation; nationalism has become a religion. 130 
Gokalp's own definition of a nation is: a society consisting of people who speak 
the same language, have had the same education and are united in their 
religious, moral and aesthetic ideals -in short, those who have a common 
culture and religion. 131 
He believed that it is the people, or the nation which is the final and 
unerring criterion of what is desirable or undesirable, what is to be 
taken and what rejected. Whatever the 'collective conscience' of the 
people accepts is normal; whatever it rejects is 'pathological'. As the 
ultimate reality of contemporary society is the nation, and as national 
ideals are ultimate forces orienting the behavior of the individuals, so 
the most difficult mission for the Turks, according to Gokalp, is 
awakening as a nation in order to adapt themselves to the conditions of 
contemporary nationalism. He transformed the Turkism of the purist 
pan-Turkists from a mere political concept into a cultural one. 132 : 
We shall create a genuine civilization, a Turkish civilization ... The Turkish race 
has not been degenerated like some other races by alcohol debauchery. Turkish 
blood has remained rejuvenated and hardened like steel with the glories of the 
battlefield. The Turkish intelligence is not worn out, its sentiments are not 
129Gokalp,Z. Turkish Nationalism ... ,p.23. 
130Heyd,U. op.cit.,p.57. 
131 Ibid., p.63. 
132Gokalp,Z. Turkish Nationalism ... ,p.22. These concepts, namely, collective 
conscience, nonnal and pathological were adapted by Durkheimian sociology. 
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effeminate, its will is not weakened. The conquest of the future is promised to 
Turkish resolution. 133 
Gokalp describes his age as the "age of nationalism" and maintains that 
the most powerful force over the mind of this age was the ideal of 
nationalism. To him, if states ignore the existence of that important 
social factor, they would doomed to failure. Furthermore, he argues that 
states have to govern on the basis of national consciousness. He 
complains for the negligence of that fact among the Turkish nation: 
"The Turks' avoidance of the idea of nationalism was not only harmful 
for the state ... , but it was fatal for the Turks themselves."134 
In Gokalp's writings, the notion of "state" and "fatherland" have taken a 
considerable place. But his assertion is mostly on the fatherland rather 
than the state. Because at that time in the empire , state was signifying a 
representative of the multi-national entity, that is, Ottoman state, and 
this situation was disturbing to Gokalp. As I quoted above, for him, a 
state can exist if based on one nation, since men belonging to different 
nations cannot love the same fatherland. 135 He criticized Tanzimat 
leaders' attempts to construct the Ottoman nation, a pseudo nation-
state. He made this criticism after referring to Egyptian and Albanian 
separatist movements.136 Then he argued: " If the aim of Ottomanism 
was a state, all' the subjects would actually be members of this state. 
But if the aim was to construct a new nation whose language was the 
Ottoman language, the new nation would be a Turkish nation, since the 
133lbid., p.60. 
134 lbid., p.72. 
135Heyd,U., op.cit.p.73. 
136Arai,M. Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1992, p.61. 
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Ottoman language was no other than Turkish." 137 In short, he criticized 
them for constructing the Ottoman nation through Ottomanization 
without a national Turkish identity. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning, Gokalp was a supporter of the Ottoman 
state; "Turkish nationalism is not contrary to the interests of the 
Ottoman state; in fact, it is its most important support ... Turkism is the 
real support of Islam and of the Ottoman state, and is against 
cosmopolitanism. 11138 
For Gokalp, state is not a power existing by itself. The state derives its 
power from the nation and from the ummah. Thus there are only two 
things which are sacred: the nation and the ummah. State cannot be a 
sacred thing. On the other hand, the concept of fatherland, for him, 
means a sacred piece of land for whose sake people shed their blood. 
For the Turks, the real fatherland is Turan139 : " For the Turks, Fatherland 
means neither Turkey, nor Turkestan; Fatherland is a large and eternal 
country: Tu ran." This pan-Turkist zeal of Gokalp, gradually disappeared 
in his writings, towards the end of his life, and it was replaced by a more 
moderate and democratic sense of nationalism. 
In Gokalp's terminology, the underlying issue was on the combination of 
the three ideological components which can be traced back to the 
Young Ottoman thought; Turkification, lslamization and Westernization. 
137Gokalp,Z. Turkish Nationalism ... , pp.70-71. 
138lbid., p.74. 
139lbid., pp.78-79. 
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In constructing such a synthesis, Gokalp's genius was able to present 
an equivalence among all these elements. 
He could handle the dichotomies of tradition-modernity, continuity-change, 
nationalism-internationalism, and lslamism-secularism much better than his 
contemporaries. What has not been duly appreciated in Gokalp's thought is the 
fact that, in his synthesis, the emphasis is always on the second terms of these 
dichotomies .•• In this sense, Gokalp's thought is more modern than traditional, 
and universalist than nationalist...140 
While such an amalgamation caused a paradox as to the identification 
process, it also made so much crucial contributions to the nationalist 
tradition of Turkey which constituted a heritage for the later 
generations. Indeed, this kind of synthesis shows the foisted identity in 
Gokalp's ideas. 
The corporatist and solidarist way of thinking is also a noteworthy issue 
that signifies somehow a totalitarian and anti-individualistic aspect of 
Gokalp. That is, he gave a considerable importance to the society and 
nation in whole, and in his system, there was no room for the absolute 
value of the individual. "The individual who, according to his definition 
is not self-centered ego, can never serve as a moral ideal. Personality 
also, as we have seen, is worthy of honor and esteem only because it 
represent and reflects society, i.e. the nation." 141 • In his solidaristic 
model, the individual does not have rights as in the liberal model, but he 
has duties. For him, one cannot change the society by changing the 
individual, but vice versa: 
Do not say 'I have rights'; 
140Parla, T. op.cit. p.22. 
141 Heyd, U. op.cit. p. 124. 
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there is only duty, no right. 
There is no 'I' and 'you,; but We; 
We are both Ruler and Ruled, to be. 
We means One; 
I and You worship the One. 
Whatever is your service, 
That is your assistance. 
Your merit do not reveal, 
So that it may be real. 142 
Hans Kohn and Uriel Heyd maintain that Gokalp's nationalism signifies 
typically a cultural nationalism rather than political. For Heyd, although 
Gokalp borrowed most of his theories from French sociology and 
philosophy, his nationalism is more of the central European and 
particularly German type. According to Heyd, the main reason for the 
similarities between Gokalp's Turkism and German nationalism lies in 
the political and social conditions which in both countries differed from 
those in Western Europe. " Autocratically ruled like Prussia, the 
Ottoman empire assigned to the Army and bureaucracy a similar 
prominence. Officers and officials were the most respected citizens in 
both countries. Gokalp's demand for the complete subordination of the 
individual to society, though adopted from Durkheim, confirms to the 
Prussian ideal of absolute devotion of the citizen to the state even to the 
extinction of his personality." 143 
From the standpoint of Kohn's definition of cultural (organic) 
nationalism, Heyd argues that Gokalp's Turkism, like nationalism in 
most politically and socially backward countries, found its first and main 
expression in the field of culture: " Gokalp's preoccupation with national 
142Parla, P. op.cit.,68. 
143Heyd, U. op.cit., p.165. 
62 
folklore and sagas, ancient customs and popular traditions, bears a 
striking similarity to the romantic school of German nationalism and the 
ideologies influenced by it ( Mazzini in Italy, the Slavophils in Russia, 
etc.) ... Thus Turkism resembles German nationalism which more than 
elsewhere aspired to be not merely a political programme, but a 
complete philosophy of life." 144 
The influences of German nationalism on Gokalp's ideas have been 
remarked also by Ak~ura. He resembles Gokalp especially to the 
German philosopher; Fichte: 
Gokalp Ziya Bey reminds me the German philosophers in the first half of the 19th 
Century, the founder of systems, mystics and poets, especially Schelling and Fichte. 
The activity undertaken by Ziya Bey in the field of Nationalism the value and 
importance that he accorded to education, university, propaganda, to the theoretical 
and practical aspects of the economic and political questions, all reminds me very 
much the activity of Fichte in Prussia145 
Kohn has the same idea that Gokalp's nationalism represents the 
German type of nationalism. After quoting his famous motto: "The 
Turkish people's fatherland is not Turkey, nor Turkestan, it is a far-flung 
land, and eternal: Turan.", Kohn concludes; "This semireligious effusion 
of nationalist sentiment was the typical language of central and eastern 
European, and soon of Asian and African, nationalism in the twentieth 
century."146 
144lbid., p.166. 
145Ak(jura,Y. "Gokalp Ziya Bey hakkmda hatira ve mulahazalar'' Tiirk Yurdu, 2. seri, 1/4, 
Arahk 1924, pp. 156-162. (translated by me). 
146Kohn,H. op.cit., p.106. 
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I have tried to give some theoretical accounts on Gokalp. All of these 
theories involve some misleading interpretations. In my opinion, 
restricting Turkish nationalism merely to such theories does not provide 
us a comprehensive basis to elucidate its many aspects. Although these 
theories specify several contemplation and contributions on this issue, I 
believe, they are insufficient to propose a satisfactory perspective. 
Because, for me, every nationalist tradition should be evaluated and 
understood in its own context. Labeling one nationalist tradition in 
accordance with the other would cause some misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations. Especially on Turkish nationalism this labeling 
would totally be improper. Since, to my mind, it consists of several 
peculiarities common with both German and Western European sorts of 
nationalisms. Additionally, Turkism owes particular characters that is 
only special and idiosyncratic to it. 
3.5 YUSUF AK<;URA ON TURKISH NATIONALISM 
Even though, Ak~ura could not get enough popularity as Gokalp, and 
remained as a "forgotten man" 147 in the tradition of nationalism in 
Turkey, his ideas and reflections were more noteworthy and valuable 
than Gokalp. While many intellectuals including Gokalp were firmly 
committed with the idea of Ottomanism and with the multi-ethnic 
structure of the empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, Ak~ura 
was establishing the foundations of Turkish nationalism based on the 
concept of race. "During these pre revolutionary years of discussion and 
intellectual confusion, only one voice reflected the values of the new 
147Berkes, N. (1976) "Unutulan Adam" in Sosyoloji Konferanslan, XIV, istanbul, pp.194-
203. 
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nationalist group on a political level. That was Yusuf Akt;ura. 148" 
Moreover, his analysis of nationalism had very strong theoretical roots 
different from other nationalist ideologues. However, he was not able to 
escape from pragmatical solutions. 
In a lengthy article entitled "Ut; Tarz-1 Siyaset" (Three Ways of Policy) 
published in 1904 in Cairo, Ak~ura surveyed the ideologies of 
Ottomanism, Pan-lslamism and Turkism in order to find a plausible 
answer to the question: "How can this state be saved?". The solution 
proposed by Ak~ura with his own expression corresponded to the idea 
of "a political Turkish nationality based on race 11149• Before giving a 
decision, he evaluates all of these policies from a pragmatical 
perspective. Even though he accepts that Turkism is the right path to 
follow, he did not ignore the Islamic religion due to its function as a 
basis of emotional security and loyalty. The foisted identity is a 
remarkable case also in the ideas of Akt;ura: 
Although, the nationalist ideas began to prevail among the Turks, with the 
influence of the West, it is a quite recent phenomenon. The idea of Turk, Turkish 
literature, the reverie of unifying the Turks is like a new-born infant. The well 
established organization, the ardent sentiments and enthusiasm that we see in 
Islam, in sum almost none of all matters and preparations that would provide a 
solid unity, do not exist in Turkishness. Today, most of the Turks have been 
unaware of their past. 
But, it should be noticed that the great majority of Turks are Muslims. In that 
sense, the Islamic religion can be an important element in the fonnation/genesis 
of a greater Turkish nationality. Those who want to define the nation, consider 
the religion as a factor(facteur). In order to play a role in the union of the Turks, 
14~er~ N. (1964) The Development of Secularism in Turkey, McGill Univ. Press, 
Montreal, p. 381. 
149Georgeon, F. (1980) Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc: YusufAkr;ura (1876-1935), 
Editions ADPF, Paris, p.26. 
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Islam, like Christianity in recent times, has to be a transformer by giving a way 
to the rise of the nationalities within it. This transformation is almost an 
obligation; the general tendency in the history of our epoch, is in the favor of 
the races. Religions ... increasingly loose their political importance and strength. 
Rather than being social, religions are becoming an individual phenomenon. In 
societies, the unity of religions (Vahdet-i Edyan) are being replaced by the free 
conscience (Serbesti-i vicdan) ... Therefore religions can preserve their political 
and social importance by associating with, and even serving the races. 
(Orthodoxy in Russia, Protestantism in Germany, Anglicanism in England, 
Catholicism in diverse countries).150 
As it is clear, Ak~ura specifies religion as a tool or an agent which 
provides the emotional security and the enthusiasm for nationalism. For 
him, religion should give way to or even be replaced by the nation. 
However, this does not mean that Ak~ura was against religion. I believe, 
such an estimation is totally wrong. He had never been apart from the 
ideas of Gasp1rah who tried to combine nationalism with Islam. Ak~ura 
was an adherent disciple of Ismail Gasp1rah. 
While comparing the Islamic, Ottoman and Turkish components of the 
problems facing the Ottoman intellectuals, he asked "Are the interests 
of these three components common and identical?" The interests of the 
three major elements in the Ottoman Empire --the Turks, non-Turkish 
Muslims, and non-Muslims, did not altogether coincide. It was inevitable 
to recognize the national aspirations of the non-Turks and non-Muslims. 
Hence, there was only one thing left for the Turks to recognize their own 
national sentiments to disregard of being Ottomans, and to be content 
with being Turks151 • He considered the unity of the Ottoman nations as 
an imaginary project that is impractical anytime: 
150Akc;ura, Y. (1987) 0~ Tarz-1 Siyaset, Ti.irk Tarih Kurumu Bas1mevi, Ankara, 2nd 
edition, pp.34-35, (translated by me). 
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The history, traditions, religions, relations, aspirations and images, types of 
thinking, life styles, civilizational levels of the elements of the Ottoman subjects 
are too different from each other to imagine even of their unity with a sort of 
hannony. This is so strange. The Christian Serb who fanns in the Kosova Plain 
and the Muslim Arab who lives as a nomad in the desert of Nedc have no 
connection point with each other. How can this unity and hannony be possible. 
I ask: Is there any Muslim who will sacrify himself from his appointed religious 
personality in favor of the unity of elements ( lttihad-i anasir )"152 
As it is seen here, Ak~ura differentiates Islamic nations from the non-
Muslim subjects. While he was pointing that the harmony was 
impossible, his main criteria was the incompatibility between Islamic life 
styles with the non-Muslim civilizations. Ak~ura mentions about two 
different civilizations that are very different from each other. The Islamic 
and the Western-Christian civilizations. 
It is very clear that in the Ottoman territories there are two civilizations, two 
philosophies of life which are separated from each other in the sense of their 
consideration of the life and universe, are now clashing. Is it possible of their 
hannony? If it is not, which one of them consents the other's 
domination/supremacy? ... To sum up, in the Ottoman territories there is not 
only an impossibility of the representation but also the occurrence of the unity 
is absurd. 153 
One of the most important issue that differs Akcura from the other 
nationalists, was his considerable assertion on the economic 
prerequisites of nationalism. He accepted economy and the bourgeois 
revolution as sine qua non material condition of nation states. Unlike 
151 Berkes, N, (1964) op.cit., p.381. 
152Ak~ura, Y. (1904) "lttihad-1 Anasir Meselesi" in Sirat-1 Mustakim, V/121, 16 Kanun-u 
evvel 1326/ 29 Aralik 1910, pp. 280-283, (translated by me). 
1531bid., p. 283, (translated by me). 
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Gokalp's solidarism and corporatism, he favoured the class-based 
analysis of the society which reminds the Marxist approaches. Ak~ura 
argued: 
The most important aspect of this economic awakening is the change we see in 
the mentality that despised trade and industry and believed that government 
and military occupations were the most worthy of an Ottoman Turk... The 
foundation of the modem state is the bourgeois class. Contemporary 
prosperous states came into existence on the shoulders of the bourgeoisie, of 
the businessman and bankers. the Turkish national awakening in Turkey is the 
beginning of the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie. And, if the national growth 
of the Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage or interruption of the 
Turkish state has been guaranteed.154 
Ak~ura was aginst the foreign capital penetration to the Ottoman State. 
For him , the inner rationale behind the dissolution of the empire was 
the exploitation of the country by foreign capital. 
The main reasons of the impoverishment of the country in time, was according 
to me, related to the penetraton of the foreign capital, through interest and 
dividends" by destroying our independent industry and commerce, foreign 
capital extracted and oppressed national wealth. " 155 
Nevertheless, for Ak~ura, this situation would be helpful in stimulating 
the national consciousness among the Turks: " The hostility of the real 
bourgeoisie party against the supremacy and domination and of the 
154Cited in Niyazi Berkes. (1964) op.cit., p.425. 
155Ak~ura, A. (1986) "TUrkiye'de Avrupa Sermayesi" in F.Georgeon, Turk 
Milliyet~iliginin Kokenleri, p. 150, (translated by me). 
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international capital, would made the hostile nationalism more violent in 
the course of time"156 
Ak~ura's studies consist of a wide range of analysis on his society 
which include various subjects. Unfortunately, I believe, the Turkish 
readers generally know only about his article Uf Tarz-1 Siyaset without a 
deep information. If we return to the article Uf Tarz-1 Siyaset, one can 
say that there are two aspects discussed in "three ways of politics". 
The first is a critical aspect questioning of the thesis of the Young Turks 
on the issue of nationalism. The second is the political project 
represented by Ak~ura. First of all Uf Tarz-1 Siyaset can be considered 
as a pamphlet against the Young Turks. Ak~ura judged their political 
programme as "rather vague and outdated". Uf Tarz-1 Siyaset, seeing 
the problem of cohesion and force more urgent than the problem of the 
liberty in the empire, accentuated on them. This idea led the complete 
break of Ak~ura from the liberalism of a Young Turk157 
The whole article is devoted to the discussion of the ways of preserving 
Ottoman state from the decline and the dissolution. Ak~ura argues; for 
which societies interest should I work? I am an Ottoman and Muslim 
Turk ; therefore I want to serve in favor of the Ottoman state and all 
Turks. Although Ak~ura's evaluation was from the point of view of 
preserving the state, he did not hesitate to expose the idea of significant 
structural and territorial transformations and asked rather courageously 
whether the real source of the power of the Ottoman State comes from 
156Ak~ura, A. (1986) "Toplumsal S1mflar ve Siyasal Partiler" in F.Georgeon, Turk 
Milliyet~iliginin Kokenleri, p. 151, (translated by me). 
'
57Georgeon, F. (1980) Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc: YusufAkfura (1876-1935), 
Editions ADPF, Paris, p.25. 
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the conservation of its actual boundaries or not.158 That is, for him, for 
the sake of the maintenance or perpetuation of the state, the territories 
of the state can be transformed and changed. 
Considered as a whole Yusuf Ak~ura had no difficulty in defining strictly 
the understanding of the concept "Turkism". Certainly, he was not the 
theoretician of Turkish nationalism. He was mainly interested in the 
political aspect of the question: Pan Turkism rather than Turkishness. 
The "Turkic world "(Le Monde Turc} was a large and vague concept. It 
can be considered as a defensive solidarity for a group of societies 
which could not form an homogenous structure as well as a support 
against imperialism.159 Ak~ura proposed very radical changes in 
general; a new form of solidarity based on race, a new territorial 
equilibrium and new perspectives for the future. 
As it is clear, the Ottoman intellectuals were in a search for alternative 
solutions to save their state from the existent discontents and 
uneasiness. The maintenance and perpetuation of the state was an 
initial and vital concern for them. This situation enabled them to reach 
more pragmatic and immidiate solutions. Theoretical and speculative 
interest of the problem had not taken a greater place in their ideology. 
Different ideological components that seem to be contradictory with 
each other were easily combined in a coherent identity. This identity 
can be labeled as a foisted identity, because the ambivalent and 
conflicting paradigms constituted a harmonious and consistent 
ideology in their minds. In private and ethical sphere, they were lslamist 
158lbid., pp.25-26. 
159lbid., p.27. 
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and religion was the main determinant for them. As a political ideology, 
they had the tendency to incline towards Turkism and anti-Western 
attitudes. On the other hand, in social and economic life, their ideas 
were Westemist and based on the adaptation of the West. These various 
spheres composed a compatible and congenial ideology for the sake of 
the perpetuation of the state. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
From the standpoints of all the arguments that are pointed out 
throughout the thesis, we can conclude that there is no unique way of 
studying the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. Wide range of 
theories on nationalism, various interpretations on the origins of 
national awakenings, different historical facts and narratives enabled 
me not to make a definite conclusion. However, it can be argued that 
there are several points that would be correct and real as a conclusion 
on the origins of Turkish Nationalism. First of all, the adherents of 
Turkish nationalism were not a homogenous group. "They represented 
the entire constellation of nationalist, or rather protonationalist, 
tendencies ... their basic political ideology was formed, not as a reaction 
to Ottomanism, but as a reaction to the possibility of its 
disappearance."160 Until the end of the World War II, they continued to 
regard the Ottoman state as a source of legitimacy because it was 
regarded paradoxically as a defensive weapon against the Western 
colonialism. 
Secondly, the intellectuals and the elites were in a search for an 
alternative remedy in order to save their state and to reach their past 
glorious days. The most popular solution was to adopt the material 
domain of the Western civilization to their states and supplement it with 
their spiritual and cultural virtues. For the first time in Ottoman history, 
they divided the world of social institutions and practices into two 
domains --the material and the spiritual (or moral). This formula, I think, 
160Haddad, M. op.cit. p.217. 
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is a fundamental feature of the nationalist thought of the time and it 
remained as an heritage among the later nationalists. Moreover, the 
acceptance of the material domain of Western Civilization, in course of 
time led to the intellectuals to adopt the social and ideological domain 
of it. The process of Westernization and modernization deeply affected 
their life styles. Their enemies gradually became their model of 
development. Due to the fact that the Ottoman State could not bridge 
the increasing power gap between the West and herself, the intellectuals 
paradoxically praised the virtues of modernization. Ottoman civilization 
lacked behind that of the West. 
For the explanations of Turkish Nationalism, the studies that focus on 
the philosophical or the speculative writings of Turkish Nationalists 
such as Ziya Gokalp or the other Young Turks are far from having 
explanatory power. The effects of thinkers cannot be compared with the 
effects of Fichte on the development of German Nationalism. This 
difference did not stem from the importance of the thinkers. But, as 
Mardin puts it; "The weight of the German philosophers on the 
development of German Nationalism derives not only from the ability of 
the philosophers but also from the role of the philosophical 
speculations in the culture of the nations" 161 • So, "in those countries 
(Turkey is among them) which does not have a tradition of philosophy, 
explanations based on the 'great thinkers' would loose their explanatory 
power" 162• The nature of the Turkish intelligentsia and political elite lead 
them to be realist and pragmatic end, rather than the romantic. The 
161 Mardin, ~.op.cit., p.10. 
1621bid., p.10. 
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search for "optimal solution" and the basic preoccupation with "how to 
save the state" made the Ottoman intellectuals of the time nationalist: 
That they chose to work for the strengthening of the Ottoman state is not really 
surprising since that state was the only important Turkish and/or Muslim state 
in existence at the time. There simply was no alternative ... like all nationalists 
they opted for the 'maximal' solution. The Young Turks would continue to do so 
until the end of their rule in 1918, first with Pan-lslamism (after the debacle of 
the idea of the lttihadi Anasir) and increasingly with (Pan)Turkism after 1913, 
when even Islam proved to fail as a basis for loyalty to the empire.163 
But the general developments which created a cultural and scientific 
Turkism in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire helped these realist 
intellectuals in formulating their ideas at a more philosophical and 
theoretical level. 
Formation of a new identity, instead of the old ones, created several 
dilemmas for the intellectuals. Due to the fact that the new identity was 
seen as a motor of progress and as liberal, the old identities, such as 
religious, had to be omitted or at least maintained under the umbrella of 
the new. Since it was the obstacle to progress and modernity. On the 
other hand, ironically, the source and the inventor of progress and 
liberty, i.e. the Western Civilization, apart from its "good sides", had to 
be rejected for its imperialistic and hegemonic character: 
Rejection of an alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated 
and surpassed by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are 
seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity. This 
contradictory process is therefore deeply disturbing as well. Eastern 
163ZUrcher, E.J. op.cit., p.23. 
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nationalism is disturbed and ambivalent as the nationalisms of Herder and 
Mazzini were not.164 
In order to overcome these dilemmas and contradictions and reach a 
plausible solution, the Ottoman intellectuals tried to combine different 
elements namely Islam, Westernization, Turkification etc. which can be 
traced back to the Young Ottoman thought. Given the fact that the 
paramount identification was a religious one, religion had always been 
included to the trinities. Religion was one of the basic problematic for 
the nationalists. As it is mentioned before, on the one hand, it was seen 
an obstacle in front of the development, but on the other hand, without 
religion it would be so arduous to foist the project of a new alien identity 
which was deficient in emotional security and vehemence. To reconcile 
Western concepts and practices with traditional Islamic and later 
Turkish values was not an accommodating endeavor and project. The 
result was, invariably, either flimsy eclecticism or internally paradoxical 
combination. 
It is remarkable that, to the end of the Empire, despite the loss of more 
lands to nascent nations and European powers and despite the increase 
of Turkish nationalist feeling among the Ottoman Turkish elite, the 
concept of Ottomanism persisted and even implemented. "By the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nearly all of the Muslim and 
non-Muslim subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire had turned to 
nationalism. The Turks however retained a vision of themselves as 
Muslim first and foremost. Nationalism came to them in a way that was 
very late, somewhat artificial, and extremely problematic ... " 165 Indeed, the 
164Chatterjee,P. (1993) Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a derivative 
discourse, Univ. of Minnesota Press, p.2. 
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transition from Ottomanism to Turkish Nationalism was not an easy 
process. Even the last Ottoman Parliament of 1920, voting the National 
Pact that was actually the charter of the Turkish Nationalist Movement, 
insisted that there should be "an Ottoman Empire and an Ottoman 
Nation"11i6. "The idea of an Ottoman nation was so brilliant that it would 
not be easily given up by Ottoman intellectuals. Almost all of the Young 
Turks displaying antidespotic activities in Europe, held this idea too; 
they regarded the unity of the nation as a matter of course. " 167 
In short, Turkish Nationalism was not a consistent and coherent 
programme of action that aimed in accordance with a determined 
strategy or project. Nor it was inspired by certain theoretical and 
ideological patterns. Rather, it was mainly a pragmatic policy which was 
a last remedy to maintain the integrity and unity of the state for the 
intellectuals and state elites. It is true that there was a general 
intellectual awakening of Turkism in culture, history, language and 
literature. But we should not forget that these were not transformed into 
policies in an idealistic manner. Ottoman politics had a different logic 
and dynamics which generally disregarded these intellectual efforts and 
pursued Ottomanist and Pan-lslamist policies till the end. Only after the 
political exigencies necessitated the foundation of a Turkish nation 
state, these intellectual contributions were valued and transformed to 
political action. 
165Rose, J.A .. op.cit., p.327. 
166Davison, R. (1977) "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman 
Response" in W.W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald (ed.) Nationalism in a Non-National 
State, p.52. 
167Arai, M. (1992) Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era, E.J.Brill: Leiden, p.3. 
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